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Every month the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics issues a
report on employment and unemployment. Even if you are not old
enough to remember the Great Depression, you may think, as I do,
that a decline in unemployment is good news. But when the number
of the unemployed goes down month after month, the people who
trade in stocks become fearful that interest rates will be raised.' The
committee of the Federal Reserve System that regulates those rates
has tended to interpret a low level of unemployment as a sign that the
economy is "overheating" and in need of a cold-water bath to prevent
inflation.2 The regulators often refer to a five or six percent civilian
t David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, University of California, Los
Angeles. This Article is an expanded version of the Robert S. Stevens Lecture given at
Cornell Law School on November 1, 1996.
In this project I have drawn heavily on the work and the advice of three colleagues:
William Forbath, Joel Handler, and Gillian Lester. My foomote citations to their work
cannot fully reflect the magnitude of my debt to them. I am also grateful tojody Freeman,
Robert Goldstein, Gerald L6pez, Gerald McAlinn, Richard Sander, andJonathan Varat for
their thoughtful comments on a draft of this paper.
1 See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Labor Market Tightens But Pay Gains Stay Slim, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1996, at D1; Robert A. Rosenblatt, U.S. Jobless Rate Hits 7-Year Low, LA
TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1996, at A1; Stocks, Bonds Pounded as Rate Worries Grow, LA TimEs, Sept. 6,
1996, at D2. An increase in the unemployment rate, on the other hand, tells stock traders
to buy. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Jobless Rate Edges Up; Stocks Soar, LA TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1996,
at Al.
2 For detailed descriptions of the mechanics of this type of regulation, see generally
WiLLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY
(1987). The interest-rates policy is designed to affect economic decisionis in a multistage
process: (1) Higher interest rates will deter businesses from borrowing in order to expand
their operations. (2) If employers cannot expand, they will not want to hire more
employees. (3) If there is a big enough surplus of workers at the lowest wage levels, those
workers will not have the bargaining power to insist on higher wages. (4) Wage stability at
the lowest level will translate into a similar stability higher up the employment ladder,
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unemployment rate as the "natural" level, and if Mother Nature
should fail to produce the right level on her own, they stand ready to
help.
3
No one disputes that there is some trade-off between full
employment and the avoidance of inflationary pressures. Nor can
one deny that workers who are employed benefit from an anti-
inflation policy to the extent that it protects the buying power of their
wages against erosion. For the moment, it is enough to recognize that
our national employment policy is not a full employment policy but a
policy to control the demand for labor, keeping unemployment at a
level high enough to prevent wages from rising too much.
The bankers who play so strong a role in setting national
employment policy would not use a word like "crisis" when talking
about work. For them, the main problem associated with work arises
when too manyjobs are chasing too few potential workers.4 And, after
all, how can anyone speak of an impending crisis of work if
unemployment has dipped below five and a half percent? To answer
that question, we need to consider the ways in which the official
unemployment rate-an artifact of counting-understates the
difficulty millions of Americans face when they seek steady, adequately
paid work. For one thing, many who are wholly unemployed have
become so discouraged that they have simply stopped looking for
work. These people are not counted in the official unemployment
figures; if they were counted, the figures would be much greater.5
And unemployment for black Americans consistently runs at about
because every employee knows that if she should demand a higher wage, someone on a
lower rung stands ready to take the job at her current wage. (5) This general wage stability
will avoid the necessity for employers to raise their prices. (6) So, the nation will avoid an
upward spiral of wages and prices. See id. at 564-66.
3 On the "natural" rate of unemployment, see Robert Eisner, Our NAIRULimit: The
Governing Myth of Economic Policy, AM. PROSPECt, Spring 1995, at 58-63. NAIRU stands for
'nonaccelerating-inflation-rate of unemployment." Id. at 58. During most of the 1990s,
the rate was set at about 6%. See id. at 59. Now it seems pegged around 5%. SeeJames
Risen, A Plea for More Flexibility on Monetary Policy, LA. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at D4. The
Federal Reserve's economists may be rethinking the model of a natural unemployment
rate that almost automatically dictates interest-rate adjustments. See James Y. Galbraith,
The Surrender of Economic Policy, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 60, 61-64; Risen, supra; at
D4. My colleague Richard Sander has reminded me that, in one sense, there is a natural
unemployment rate owing to the "friction" of job changes. This rate, he says, would be
around 2%.
4 See, e.g., Jobless Benefit Claims Take Unexpected Dip, LA TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at D2
(anticipating a decline of unemployment below the previous month's rate and quoting
Federal Reserve GovernorJanet Yellen, who says history suggests that "'the economy is now
operating in an inflationary danger zone'").
5 See Lester Thurow, The Crusade That's Killing Prosperity, AM. PROSPECr, Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 54, 56. For Thurow's estimate, see infra note 16.
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twice the rate for whites at any age level.6 But even this is only part of
the story.
7
The official figures count part-time, temporary, and seasonal
workers as employed, even though they may ardently desire steady,
full-time work.8 "Consultants" are counted as employed even when
they are self-employed only because they cannot find other work.9
Despite the recent creation of millions of new jobs, a great many of
these jobs offer part-time work or work that is temporary or otherwise
contingent10 These "permanent temporary workers" generally
receive lower hourly wages than those paid to full-time, year-round
workers."' More disturbingly, in a system that largely ties social
6 See A COMMON DESTINY. BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 294-97 (Gerald DavidJaynes
& Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 103 (1992) (charting the persistence of the 2-1 ratio in every
year from 1960 through 1990). The pattern continues in the 1990s. See MELVIN L. OLIVER
& THOMAS M. SHAPIRO. BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEw PERSPECTrIVE ON RACIAL
INEoUALrrY 24 (1995). On the dramatic rise in black male joblessness since 1970, see
CHRISTOPHERJENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL PoucY. RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 122-
30 (1992). Jencks remarks, "Slack labor markets have always had catastrophic effects on
urban blacks .... If we could get the overall unemployment rate back down to 3 or 4
percent, joblessness among blacks would also drop precipitously." Id. at 125.
7 In the following discussion I draw on Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld,
Reform Work, Reform Welfare 84-137 (July, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
8 See Thurow, supra note 5, at 56.
9 See id.
10 The number of temporary and otherwise contingent workers is difficult to calculate
with any precision. According to an estimate conducted in 1994, the number of people
working for temporary employment agencies on an average day clusters around 1.6
million, a number reflecting rapid growth since 1984. See Developments in the Law:
Employment Discrimination, 109 HARv. L. Rzv. 1568, 1652 n.29 (1996). The term
"contingent workers" is applied to a varied group, including part-time, temporary,
seasonal, leased, involuntarily self-employed, contract, and home-based workers. A 1987
estimate placed the total number of contingent workers at a minimum of 29 million
people. See Anne E. Polivka & Thomas Nardone, The Quality of Jobs: On the Definition of
"Contingent Work," 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 9, 13 (Dec. 1989) (citing the contingent work
force estimate made by Richard S. Belous of the National Planning Association).
The recent growth in part-time jobs has been mainly caused not by worker demand
but by a reduced supply of good jobs, or, in Economese, "sectoral shifts in the economy
toward industries dominated by low-wage, part-time employment." Chris Tilly, Short Hours,
Short Shrift: The Causes and Consequences of Part-Time Employment, in NEw PoLICIES FOR THE
PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WOREFORCE 15, 28 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992)
[hereinafter NEw POLICIES] (emphasis omitted). These shifts mainly reflected "explicit
employer strategies to subcontract work and redesign jobs to be carried out by part-time
and temporary workers." Eileen Appelbaum, Structural Change and the Growth of Part-Time
and Temporary Employment, in NEw POLICIES, supra, at 1, 7-8.
11 See Stanley D. Nollen, Negative Aspects of Temporary Employment, 17 J. LAB. RES. 567,
569-70 (1996) (reporting that 1994 average hourly wages of temporary workers were 35%
lower than wages of comparable full-time workers). These lower wages, along with the
increase in the proportion of workers who are temporarily employed, may partially explain
why a reduced official unemployment rate in the past two years has not been accompanied
by the inflationary pressures that the Federal Reserve economists expected.
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welfare to jobs,' 2 these temporary and contingent jobs typically offer
no health insurance,' 3 no child care,' 4 no pension benefits, and little
opportunity for advancement. 15 One can only estimate degrees of
underemployment; one of the higher estimates is that as much as one-
third of the American labor force wants work, wants more work, or has
given up on the possibility of finding work.16 Ultimately, a greater
flexibility of employment, includingjob-sharing itself, may be part of a
12 Even this "employee welfare state" is in trouble. See generally the trenchant
analysis in David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1601
(1996) (discussing the growth of the employee welfare state, its current state of crisis, and
prospects for reform).
13 "[S]ince 1990, the nation's mostly female temp force has mushroomed more than
85%. Yet only 8% of temps receive health benefits; pensions, vacations and sick days are
virtually unheard of." Jill Smolowe, The Stalled Revolution, TIME, May 6, 1996, at 63.
14 One serious problem for poor people who are part-time or contingent workers is
that child care centers are not open during the hours when they work-such hours
typically involve weekends, or rotating or changing schedules. These conditions are the
norm for working-poor parents. See Sandra L. Hofferth, Caring for Children at the Poverty
Line, CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 61-90 (1995).
The system of child care in the United States is analyzed rigorously in WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY, JR., EVERYBODY'S CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A PUBLIC PROBLEM (1995). Gormley's
policy proposals are an amalgam of European and American approaches. The basic
American approach, of course, is to leave the system to the market-with the predictable
result that the working poor are hard pressed. In contrast, most Western European
countries see child care as a common good and either provide it or subsidize it. See id. at 8-
12. See also Rebecca Blank, Does a Larger Social Safety Net Mean Less Economic Flexibility., in
WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES, 157, 176-79 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994) (discussing
American and European child care policies).
15 On lower wages and lack of health and pension benefits, see Francoise J. Carr6,
Temporary Employment in the Eighties, in NEW POLICIES, supra note 10, at 45, 56-58; Virginia L.
duRivage, New Policies for the Part-Time and Contingent Workforce, in NEW PoLIcIEs, supra note
10, at 89, 94-105; Tilly, supra note 10, at 21-23; Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a
Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 565-70
(1996).
16 See Thurow, supra note 5, at 56. Thurow breaks down his estimate into the
following groups:
Officially unemployed (then 5.7%) 7.5 to 8 million
No longer actively looking 5 to 6 million
Working part-time involuntarily 4.5 million
Temporary workers 8.1 million
Contingent (on call) workers 2 million
Involuntarily self-employed 8.3 million
Id. These categories, he says, add up to about 28% of the work force. See id. They do not
include 5.8 million males, aged 25-60, who were once in the work force but are now miss-
ing from the labor statistics. See id. Some of these dropouts from the ordinary working
economy are, no doubt, recruits into illegal work. See id. Thurow adds these men to reach
the "one-third" estimate noted in the text. See id.
A study published in 1994 (and thus based on data collected before the recent decline
in the official unemployment rate) estimated that people looking for work outnumbered
job vacancies by a factor of six. See Gordon Lafer, The Politics ofJob Training: Urban Poverty
and the False Promise of JTPA, 22 POL. & Soc'Y 349, 351-52 (1994). The job vacancy rate
tends to be considerably lower than the aggregate rate of unemployment; as a result, a
relatively large number of unemployed workers are "queuing" for a relatively small number
ofjobs, even in good times. See HARRYJ. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT: JOB PROSPECTS
FOR LESS-EDUCATED WORERS 28-29 (1996). In good times and bad, minorities, the young,
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sensible response to the crisis of joblessness-but not if part-time
workers are still paid lower wages and are still unprotected by private
or public health care and pension benefits.' 7
Among the newly created full-time jobs, many pay the minimum
wage. 18 Most recipients of the minimum wage are not raising
families,' 9 and for good reason: even after the increase recently
enacted by Congress, one earner's minimum wage is insufficient to
bring a family of three. up to the poverty line.2 0 The purchasing
power of the minimum wage declined sharply in the 1980s and early
1990s.2 1 With that factor compounded by the depressing effects on
wages of the large number of Americans who are looking for work, or
for more work, real wages for jobs at the lower skill levels have fallen
dramatically in the last quarter-century.22 These lowest-wage jobs
typically offer the slimmest chances for upward movement,2 3
especially for minority workers, who are disproportionately
represented in those jobs.2 4 The poverty rate for full-time workers
increased by about fifty percent from 1980 to the early 1990S.25
and the least educated experience longer-than-average spells of joblessness and are per-
ceived by employers "at the 'back of the queue'" of potential workers. I& at 29.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
18 On the minimum wage, see JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 41
(1995).
19 Sixty-six percent of the recipients are single and without children. See How Forcing
Up the Minimum Wage Hurts Those Who Need Help Most, Am. ENTER., July-Aug. 1996, at 53, 54.
20 See, e.g., Barry Bluestone & Teresa Ghilarducci, Rewarding Work: Feasible Antipoverty
Policy, THE AM. PROSPEar, May-June 1996, at 40, 44.
21 See id. at 42.
22 For employed men in the lowest fifth of a national wage distribution, real wages
(that is, wages adjusted for inflation) fell by more than 30% from 1970 to 1989. See
WILLIAMJIJLIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 25
(1996). Wage inequality rose throughout the developed world in the 1980s, but the
United States won the booby prize: "less educated and lower-paid American workers
suffered the largest erosion of economic well-being among workers in advanced countries."
Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The United States vs. Other
Advanced Countries, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RuLES, supra note 14, at 29, 39.
23 Mobility has been falling, and particularly among low-wage workers. See MOSHE
BUGHINSKY &JENNIFER HuNT, WAGE MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 5455, 1996):
24 SeeJoel F. Handler, Work, Poverty, and the Future of the Welfare State: Questions
About Social Europe by an American Observer 59 app. at 5 (June 10, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (citing Roger Waldinger, Black/Immigrant Competition
Re-assessed: New Evidence from Los Angeles (Mar. 1995) (unpublished manuscript)).
25 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 7, at 89. The overall poverty percentage for
1995, estimated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, was 13.8%, down from 14.5% in 1994.
See Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Census Finds First Income Rise in Past Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1996, at Al. More than one-fifth of American children live in poverty. See Handler &
Hasenfeld, supra note 7, at 117.
1997]
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The distribution of poverty in American society is not random. It
falls most heavily on members of some racial and ethnic minoriies,
2 6
on women, on the young, and on people with limited educational
opportunities.2 7 Lower-skill manufacturing jobs have disappeared at
an alarming rate, giving way to automation and to low-wage
competition from overseas workers.28 Service jobs, once seen as a
promising substitute, are becoming automated at a rate that beclouds
the earlier optimism.2 9 Many Americans have come to fear that their
families will fall out of the middle class because relatives or friends
have already suffered that fate.30 In the 1980s, while middle class
income and wealth stayed constant, and while the poor were
struggling to survive, the rich got much, much richer.31 The "split
society" is here
3 2
In addition to the crisis of slavery and the crisis of the Great
Depression, the nation has faced other serious challenges in the realm
of work, most notably the wrenching adjustment to industrialization
26 The poverty rate among black Americans in 1995 was 29.3%, more than twice the
national average, and that rate was exceeded by the poverty rate for "Hispanic" households
(a Census Bureau term). See Holmes, supra note 25, at Al, A23.
27 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 7, at 86-92.
28 On the global labor market and the parlous state of left-out workers throughout
the world, see Ethan B. Kapstein, Workers and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
1996, at 16. For responses to Kapstein, see Responses: Workers and Economists, FOREIGN AFF.,
July-Aug. 1996, at 164. Professor Gerald McAlinn, of Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo,
adds an international dimension to the conventional views about the domestic effects of
"cheap foreign labor." He sees the American commitment to free trade as driven in part
by consumerism. Japan, on the other hand, by protecting local producers, has accepted
very high consumer prices but achieved relatively full employment. In a September 1996
letter to me he writes, "If American consumers demand Wal-Mart prices, it is difficult to see
how America can hope to avoid a spiral into ... hollowed-out employment ... "
29 SeeJEREMY RIFIN, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE
AND THE DAWN OF THE POsr-Md KRI ERA 141-62 (1995).
30 For sobering accounts of a number of such families, from those of executives whose
companies have "downsized" to those of well-paid blue-collar workers whose plants have
been closed, see generally KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF
DOwNwARD MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS (1988).
31 The beginnings of this trend were charted in THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW
Pourncs OF INEQUALrry (1984), and pursued in THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL,
CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICs 159-63,
166-69, 193-96 (1991). See also KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH
AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH 17 (1990) (charting income
gains and losses for the average family from 1977-88); KEVIN PHILLIPS, BOILING POINT:
REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE DECLINE OF MIDDLE-CLASS PROSPERITY 24-25 (1993)
(discussing the losses in real income for the middle class). For more recent data, see
Edward N. Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced: America's Growing Concentration of Wealth, AM.
PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 58.
In 1995 the income gap between rich and poor narrowed triflingly, with the top 20%
of households receiving 48.7% of the total national household income, down from 49.1%
in 1994. See Holmes, supra note 25, at A23.
32 Seymour S. Bellin & S.M. Miller, The Split Society, in THE NATURE OF WORK:
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 173 (Kai Erikson & Steven Peter Vallas eds., 1990) [hereinafter
THE NATURE OF WoRt].
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and the pains of absorption into the work force of successive waves of
poor immigrants. Through all these experiences, work has been one
major arena in which America's basic constitutional values of liberty,
equality, and national union have been either validated or frustrated.
In this Article, I seek to show how these constitutional ideals are
infused into the social meanings of work in America. Through this
medium, the values of liberty, equality, and union have played a
powerful role in constituting individuals, social groups, and the nation
itself.
I shall not be arguing for judicial recognition of a constitutional
right to decent work. American courts lack the capacity to enforce a
constitutional right to stable, adequately compensated work-or even
to define the contours of such a right with a serviceable particularity.
33
The main responsibility for confronting the crisis of work rests with
other policymakers, both in and out of government. Yet, this Article's
exploration of the meanings of work does have two instrumental
purposes. The first is to look to our basic constitutional commitments
for guidance, as legislators and others plan their responses to the
shortage of decent jobs. The second purpose is to use the field of
work to illustrate a more general point: that the values of liberty and
equality are interwoven essentials of our national union. By
understanding some of the relations of work to community, perhaps
we can better appreciate the interdependence of citizens.
In the half-century since the Second World War, American
workers have bought into the market economy in a social contract
that runs something like this: If you are willing to work hard, your
family will be secure. Underlying this bargain are two related
expectations: jobs will be available-"full employment" was the term
in the Truman years-and social welfare programs will cushion the
blows when the employment market changes.3 4 The corollary is that
continued growth in the ranks of the unemployed and
underemployed portends a constitutional crisis for the nation.
Shrinking employment opportunity at any level is a seedbed for racial
and ethnic scapegoating. And, although most of us say that
scapegoating is an unacceptable political tactic, the effectiveness of
the tactic suggests that some of us may be more frightened than we
care to admit.35
33 For elaboration of this point, see infra Part IV.
34 More or less the same bargain was struck in Western Europe. See Kapstein, supra
note 28, at 16, 20-21.
35 See generally EDSAT I & EDSALL, supra note 31, at 137-53 (discussing the use of ethnic
scapegoating by politicians); KENNETH L. KARST, LAw's PROMISE, ILAW's ExPREsSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELUGION 67-111, 137-46 (1993) (same).
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Our current conditions do not compare with the crime of slavery
that tore the nation apart in the nineteenth century. But for millions
of Americans, the modem social contract is in breach, and, down this
road, the threat to national union does seem comparable to the threat
we faced in the 1930s. Very likely, the crisis of work will not come to a
head the day after tomorrow. But if today's part-time and contingent
workers are, as they now seem, the model of things to come-if they
are, indeed, the advance guard of a "disposable American
workforce" 36 -then none of us among the comfortable should take
for granted the stability of our constitutional order. The motto,
"Liberty and Justice for All," has a hollow ring for people who are left
out. If we do not respond to today's indicators of the coming crisis of
work, then the politics of alienation, in this era of the radio talk show
and the Internet,3 7 may take a violent turn. Surely the violence would
be met by repressive measures, and just as surely those measures
would encroach upon the liberties of all citizens. I am under no
illusion that viewing the impending crisis of work in the constitutional
perspectives of liberty, equality, and national union will head off the
crisis. Still, if there are lessons to be learned from an exercise so
limited in scope, we had better learn them.
I
LIBERTY: WORK AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENT
INDrviDUALS
Our starting point is the basic constitutional value of liberty. But
if you mention the word "work" to one who is employed, liberty may
not be the first thought that comes to mind. Indeed, when the ideas
of work and freedom are linked in conversation, chances are that the
speaker is wishing for a freedom from work. A hard-working friend of
mine often quotes the old Italian saying, dolce far niente, how sweet to
do nothing. For countless millions, work is a chore, a burden to be
borne, a source of anxiety and conflict. In Studs Terkel's memorable
words, for a large proportion of Americans work is "a Monday
through Friday sort of dying," a kind of "violence-to the spirit as well
36 Scott F. Cooper, The Expanding Use of the Contingent Workforce in the American
Economy: New Opportunities and Dangersfor Employers, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 525, 525 (Spring
1995) (quoting Secretary of Labor Robert Reich).
37 I have in mind the paramilitary groups who are already using the Internet to
exchange revolutionary rhetoric and bomb recipes. Two weeks before the 1995 bombing
of the federal building in Oklahoma, the FBI issued a warning to its intelligence bureaus
concerning the recruitment of local police officers into antigovernment militias. See




as to the body."38 So, these people might ask, what is so liberating
about work?
Probably the most vivid answers to that question would come
from people who are unemployed. They seek work not for its own
sake, but for the rewards it brings, both tangible and intangible. As
far back as the colonial era, New Englanders invested work with an
almost religious character,3 9 and white Americans generally spoke of
the dignity of work, recognizing that work had much to do with defin-
ing the person. Yet, it was not work in general that they dignified, but
the autonomy that was both expressed and reinforced by the free
choice to work.40 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention re-
flected this attitude in the wicked bargain that recognized a sharp dis-
tinction between free persons and slaves.4 ' The legal conditions of
free men (such was the usual locution) came to be defined in contrast
to slavery. If a slave was dependent, bound by law to work for an-
other's profit and under that person's control, a free citizen was in-
dependent, mobile, with the liberty to work in one pursuit or another,
and for his or her own family's benefit.42 To be a citizen is to be a
respected and responsible participant in the public life of the commu-
nity.43 Even in those early times, work was a medium through which a
free man might demonstrate that he was a citizen.
Today, I concede, other social meanings of work usually are more
conspicuous. Once when the state governor was preventing the Uni-
versity of California from giving its employees a cost-of-living pay
raise,44 a distinguished logician in the UCLA philosophy department
said to me, with perfect logic, "It isn't the money. It's what you can
buy with the money." Most obviously, jobs are "the entry tickets to
provisions."45 Whatever other meanings work may bear, for most of us
it is a crucial means of sustaining ourselves and our families. Work
can be a teacher, offering the chance to learn tasks at increasing levels
38 STUDS TERKEL, WORKING xiii (1975).
39 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, AMERICA AT 1750: A SocIAL PORTRAIT 147 (Vintage Books
ed. 1973).
40 For a modem philosopher's elaboration of this sentiment, see AMARTYA SEN, INE-
QUALITY REExAMINED 31-38 (1992).
41 On the North's various compromises with slavery at the convention, see WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAuSM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-83
(1977).
42 On the contrast between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fugitive
Slave Clause, see infra Part III.
43 I have discussed the constitutional principle of equal citizenship in Kenneth L.
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977), and at greater length in BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTrrTUnON (1989).
44 See University of California; Still Retrenching; THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 1975, at 60.




of authority and increasing levels of pay.46 Central to "the American
dream" is the notion that a free and independent individual can rise
to a better condition through hard work, and that his or her family
can join in the rise.47 Especially vital to family security today are the
health care and pension benefits that attach to many jobs. Where
there are young children, decent child care becomes an additional
family concern.
To speak of family status and family security is to recognize that
work means much more than a paycheck; it is the exercise of responsi-
bility. The responsibilities involved in work extend not just to our
loved ones but to our coworkers, and even to the larger community.
Work is still seen as connected to the citizenship values of respect,
independence, and participation. 48 In our society, as much as any-
where else in the world, work is a means of proving yourself worthy in
your own eyes and in the eyes of others. Even a person who hates his
or her job can understand the idea of "[t]he dignity of work and of
personal achievement."49
Two examples may help put human faces on these abstractions.
First, along the Interstate highways in California, a number of rest-
area parks are maintained by people who live in sheltered environ-
ments because they are mentally impaired. It is hard to imagine any
other public program that has more purely positive results. These
people are making themselves useful, and their work gives added posi-
tive meaning to their lives; they show it in the way they talk and in the
way they carry themselves. My second example needs only to be
stated: Every reader knows people of retirement age who have chosen
not to retire. Many of these people continue to work because they
want to think of themselves as active and independent. Work, even
when we complain about it, can be a major source of individual self-
realization.
46 Knowledge learned from ajob is often applied to other realms of life. See Melvin L.
Kohn, Unresolved Issues in the Relationship Between Work and Personality, in THE NATURE OF
WORE, supra note 32, at 36, 42-43.
47 Cf ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLI-
CAN PARTY BEFORE THE CML WAR 13-15 (1970) (describing the universal desire in antebel-
lum America to improve one's position in life through work). On work as the "highroad to
independence, wealth, and status," see DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 12 (1978). These beliefs are widely shared. On the forward-look-
ing attitudes of poor black Americans toward work, see JENNIFER L HOCHSCHILD, FACING
UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION 160-62 (1995).
48 For an excellent general account of the role of "earning" in the validation of an
individual's full membership in the community, seeJUDITH SHKiLAR, AMERICAN CrrIZENSHIP:
THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-101 (1991). On the constitutional dimensions of material
deprivation in the context of racial inequality, see Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and
Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1988).
49 SHRJAR, supra note 48, at 1.
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Many years ago I was at a big party, among strangers. Some small
talk had suggested that the woman next to me was a teacher in a local
school. Lacking anything better to say, I opened with, "So, you're a
school teacher?" Her reply was chilly: "It's what I do; it's not who I
am." I was duly chastened; of course there is more to a person than
the way she earns her,living: But there is also truth in the comment,
'"You become your job. '50 Work shapes individual identities in ways
both general and particular.51 Consider such terms as initiative, de-
pendability, industry, attention to detail, and cooperativeness-or still
more general terms such as work habits or the work ethic. Terms like
these-or their opposites accenting irresponsibility and sloth-are in-
ternalized, made a part of the individual worker's sense of self. Fur-
thermore, particular jobs have their own socializing effects, from the
do-it-by-the-book mindset of the clerks in a welfare office52 to the
hypermasculinity of the "splicers" who maintain heavy cables that are
strung on towers and under the ground.55
The idea that we become our jobs has another dimension: the
work we do affects other people's evaluations of us. Prominent
among the social meanings of work is a rough popular status-ordering
of types of work.54 These status evaluations are strongly influenced by
differences in pay, but they are also affected by other kinds of percep-
tions that are widely shared: the power associated with the job (police
officer), the importance of the work to society at large (school
teacher), the difficulty of entry into the job (opera conductor), the
individual's independence in performing the task (architect), the
complexity of the work (scientific researcher), the level of creativity
demanded by the work (sculptor), or the level of training required
(veterinarian). These public perceptions of what we do-or, more
precisely, our assumptions about other people's perceptions-be-
come part of our own sense of what our work is worth, and, more
generally, what we are worth as individuals. 55
50 TERKEL, supra note 38, at 102.
51 See generally Kohn, supra note 46, at 36. Kohn concludes that the exercise of self-
direction in work is a positive influence on the worker's sense of self: "People thrive in
meeting occupational challenges." Id. at 42.
52 Cf. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 14042
(1988) (describing problems encountered by welfare recipients).
53 See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, The Cultural Perspective and the Study of Work, in THE NA-
TURE OF WORK, supra note 32, at 88, 93-94.
54 These orderings are unscientific. Any pretense of exact measurement and ranking
of occupational status ought to be examined closely. For a careful exploration of the diffi-
culties associated with systems of occupational classification, see Deborah C. Malamud,
Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1847, 1872-77 (1996).
55 Studs Terkel's interviews, taken as a whole, show that the positive values I have
listed in the text are experienced by relatively few workers outside the professions. See
generally TERKEL, supra note 38, passim. The comments of the majority of his interviewees
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What happens to individuals and families when the formal free-
dom to work becomes hollow because stable work with a decent wage,
decent health and retirement benefits, and access to decent child care
just isn't available? Most obviously, family income is sharply reduced.
But other harms of unemployment and underemployment are less
tangible, growing out of the positive social meanings that Americans
have invested in work:
-If stable, adequately paid work is a source of independence, its
absence means dependence on others.
-If stable, adequately paid work is an avenue to personal
achievement, its absence signifies failure.
-If stable, adequately paid work offers advancement up the
socio-economic ladder, its absence means that one's social station is
either fixed or in decline.
-If stable, adequately paid work provides family security, its ab-
sence means insecurity.
-If stable, adequately paid work elicits the esteem of others, its
absence means shame.
Considerations like these undoubtedly have influenced the Jus-
tices who have nourished a number of constitutional guarantees that
are not in any formal sense related to the freedom to work.56 Con-
sider, for example, the application of the Equal Protection Clause to
education. When the Supreme Court held that Texas could not con-
stitutionally exclude undocumented alien children from public
schools, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court decried the irration-
ality of creating a permanent lower caste.57 One unspoken link in this
reasoning is that education is the basis for many employment oppor-
tunities, the first step on the occupational ladder for the independent
individual.58 The subject of work was also in the minds of the Justices
who first recognized a woman's constitutional right to choose to have
an abortion,5 9 and who two decades later preserved that right in the
emphasize their sense of powerlessness and unimportance, and the routinization of their
work. See id. Yet the abstract idea of work continues to hold its attractions.
56 On the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, see infra Part III. To the
extent that the right to travel may rest on this Clause, travel for the purpose of working is
built into the substance of the right. But the right to travel has also been explained on
other constitutional grounds, most notably the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982). Sometimes the right to travel is called a right to
migrate. See id. at 67 (Brennan,J., concurring) (discussing the "principle of free interstate
migration"). One typical reason for migrating is to seek employment in a new state.
57 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).
58 Similarly, when Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education, described education as "the very foundation of good citizenship," surely he had
in mind a conception of citizenship as participation that went well beyond voting. 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954).
59 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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face of an assault that almost destroyed it.60 In the latter case, the
plurality opinion was explicit: "The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."' 61 Both of
these rights are explainable in the constitutional vocabulary of equal-
ity; but they also sound in the vocabularies of individual liberty, inde-
pendence, and free access to work.
Given decisions of this kind, it may seem incongruous that the
Supreme Court in the modem era has not given constitutional recog-
nition to a free-standing right to work. Even in the days when the
Court was invalidating wage-and-hour laws and other governmental
restrictions on the liberty of the employment contract,62 the Justices
gave no hint of any individual right to be afforded work. The liberty
in question was a formal freedom from governmental regulation of
private bargains, grounded on a formal equality of right 63 -and never
mind the huge differences in the bargaining power of employers and
workers. But even this formal legal equality could be submerged. For
one example among many, a potential worker who claimed a freedom
to be idle might be imprisoned because his idleness was made into the
crime of vagrancy,6 but the idea of imposing on potential employers
a correlative legal duty to provide work was unthinkable. Any asser-
60 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
61 Id. at 856 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
62 For three decades the Supreme Court recognized the liberty of contract as a pre-
ferred freedom. In Lochner v. New York, as every law student learns, the Court struck down
a state law that prohibited the employment of bakers for more than sixty hours a week.
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). The Court's opinion, to the dismay of labor leaders, set great store
by the liberty of employees to contract to work longer hours. The doctrinal change came
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court sustained a state
regulation of women's wages.
63 American law, at least from the time of the Revolution, had consistently repre-
sented "working life in voluntaristic terms, as a network of self-interested relationships cre-
ated more or less spontaneously by the participants themselves, whose capacity so to act
was guaranteed by their constitution as ... formally equal citizens benefiting equally from
protection of their private rights." CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAw, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN
THE EARLYAMERICAN REPUBUC XV (1993) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court adopted
this view as the law of the land when it invalidated an act of Congress forbidding interstate
railroads to hire employees under "yellow dog" contracts that prohibited membership in
labor unions: "the employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and any legislation
that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract. . .
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908).
64 See DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE
UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
83-89 (1993). "There is, in just principle, nothing which a government has more clearly
the right to do than to compel the lazy to work; and there is nothing more absolutely
beyond its jurisdiction than to fix the price of labor." Id. at 88-89 (quotingJoEL BISHoP, 1
NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 273-74 (1892)). Idleness alone did not consti-
tute the crime of vagrancy; the "idle rich" committed no crime. Vagrancy meant being idle
with no visible means of support. See, e.g., id. at 84 ("Massachusetts led the way to new
legislation with an act of 1866 increasing the punishment meted out to 'idle persons who,
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tion of an employer's constitutional duty would encounter the "state
action" limitation that had been read into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,65 and a statute imposing a similar duty would be an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the employer's sphere of private liberty.66 Nor
could any comparable duties be imposed on the states or Congress.
Government's constitutional duty was noninterference, and no one in
authority thought that judges could compel legislators or executive
officials either to employ the unemployed or to take other positive
action on their behalf.
William Forbath has shown that another, more positive vision of
freedom in the world of work was available during this very period. At
a minimum, this alternative view of "free labor" would uphold wage-
and-hour laws, but it also envisioned a "right to remunerative labor,"
to be vindicated by such means as cooperative ownership, reform of
the system of finance, and legislation enhancing workers' rights to
govern themselves in the workplace. 67 Since 1937, the Supreme Court
has not treated the liberty of the employment contract as a preferred
freedom. But, by the time this change was effected, a more funda-
mental doctrinal limitation had become firmly established: the very
idea of a constitutional right to liberty had been reduced to a negative
freedom from governmental interference. 68 Although some modest
revision of this doctrine may be possible, no one should expect our
not having visible means of support, live abroad without lawful employment... or place them-
selves in the streets . .. .'") (emphasis added).
Other instances of early American law's uses of formal equality to justify asymmetries
of power favoring employers are explored in detail by TOMLINS, supra note 63, at 223-92.
65 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This decision was the fountainhead of a
body of constitutional jurisprudence centered on formal racial equality. See Kenneth L.
Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 Sup. CT. REv.
1, 15-22, 24-28.
66 See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
67 See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Laba. Labor and Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 Wis. L. Rav. 767, 800-14 [hereinafter Forbath, Free Labor] ; William E. Forbath, Why Is
This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the
Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REy. 1771, 1797-99 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PAR-
TIAL CONSrrrUTION (1993)) [hereinafter Forbath, Rights Talk].
Rejecting this view of free labor, the courts treated employers' rules as part of the
employment contract and thus protected employers with the constitutional liberty of con-
tract against legislative interference. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 64, at 43-51.
68 For a critical analysis of negative liberty (including property protections) as the
core of American constitutional rights, see David Abraham, Liberty without Equality: The
Property-Rights Connection in a "Negative Citizenship" Regime, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1996).
Frank Michelman, commenting on Abraham, makes the valuable point that some kinds of
affirmative claims on government are implicit in some kinds of negative liberty-for exam-
ple, an affirmative right to police protection to defend the individual's freedom from vio-
lence. See Frank I. Michelman, Anti-Negativity as Form, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 83, 85-87
(1996).
On formal liberty in the field of employment, see Forbath, Free Labor, supra note 67, at
815. Forbath illuminates how this formal view of freedom in the employment context was
grounded in a classical liberal vision of the idea of "free labor." See id. at 800-14.
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courts to contribute in any direct way to resolving a crisis of work.69
The unemployed have a formal constitutional freedom to work, but
only if work is available.
In the nineteenth century, American law began to confront two
stark systems of dependency, both of which centered on control over
work and its rewards. The system of slavery succumbed to constitu-
tional amendment and congressional legislation only after four years
of carnage. Married women's economic subordination to their hus-
bands eroded more gradually through legislation and judicial inter-
pretation, in a process that took more than a century.70 In each of
these cases, ending the dependency meant freeing identifiable clients
(enslaved persons, married women) from the legal control of identifi-
able patrons (slaveholders, husbands). Without success, labor leaders
of the post-Civil War era argued for their reforms as a means to re-
move the legal foundations of their "wage slavery."71 The law's in-
tended role in all these cases was to dissolve or redefine particular
legal relations that bound clients to patrons. Some post-bellum advo-
cates would have gone further than the abolition of slavery. They
sought a land reform that would put land in the hands of the former
slaves, whose labor had been so important an element in the land's
value. 72 Even before the Civil War, married women had argued for a
share of marital property on the basis of the contributions of their
own work to the family's income and wealth.73 In contrast, the victims
of today's crisis of work have no one in particular to be independent
from, no one in particular who has controlled their destinies and
whom they have enriched. To put it more abstractly, the shortage of
decent work offers no specific legal relation, the abolition of which
can lead the unemployed and underemployed from dependence to
independence.
69 This point is discussed further infra Part IV.
70 The period I have in mind runs from the statutes of the post-civil War era that gave
married women control over their earnings, to the Supreme Court's decision in Kirchbergv.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that gave the
husband full management control over community property). On the earnings statutes
and their partial subversion by judicial interpretation, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE LJ. 1073,
1179-89 (1994); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the
Age of Emancipation, 75J. AM. Hisr. 471, 481-500 (1988).
71 Forbath, Free Labor, supra note 67, at 806-17.
72 In 1864 William Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, wrote to the Committee
on Public Lands of the House of Representatives, calling for just this sort of redistribution
of lands. See WILIuAM WHrrING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 469-78 (43d ed. 1871). A modest redistribution was begun on some lands adminis-
tered by the Freedmen's Bureau, but even this program was largely thwarted by President
Andrew Johnson's amnesty decree. See E~ic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFIN-
ISHED REvoLUTION, 1863-1877, at 153-70, 18-84 (1988).
73 See Siegel, supra note 70, passim.
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When people who lack work have no one in particular to blame
for their condition, it is natural for them to turn the blame inward.74
Demoralization is a state of mind. It encompasses the sense of depen-
dence and failure, the loss of others' respect-in short, the individ-
ual's sense of exclusion from the community of equal citizens.7 5 The
worst thing about being down and out is not that you are down, but
that you are out.
II
EQUALITY WORK, STATUS, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
SocIAL GROUPS
The positive social meanings of work in America have survived
through four centuries, despite the dependency and degradation of
slavery on the plantations and the reduction of workers to cogs in the
machinery of the mills and factories that began the industrial era.7 6
Even today, the actual experience of work might be meaningless
drudgery, might be degradation-might, in fact, be violence 7 7-but
the idea of work retains its strong connections with the liberty-oriented
ideas of independence, self-expression, personal satisfaction, security,
and even dignity. These are sunshine words, but let us take note of a
cloud. Americans have also understood a worker's liberties to be im-
bued with notions of "getting ahead," of competitive individualism in
a zero-sum game of status dominance. If work in America were a food
product, the list of ingredients on the label would place individualism
first.
When we change the perspective from liberty to equality, we do
not leave this competitive atmosphere behind. Work is still a prize, a
subject of contention, a means of gaining status and denying status to
others. Indeed, a legal claim to equality is most likely to succeed when
it is cast as a claim to equal liberty. The major difference in this equal-
ity-oriented perspective is that questions about the equal status of indi-
74 For a poignant exploration of this phenomenon a generation ago, see ELLIOT
LIEBoW, TALLY's CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967) (chronicling the
experience of inner-city blacks on a street comer in Washington, D.C.). Sadly, conditions
among inner-city black Americans have deteriorated since Liebow wrote, with results that
are similarly demoralizing and similarly destructive of community. See WILSON, supra note
22, passim.
75 A work force may itself be seen as a community. In such a case, loss of the job may
be the most obvious form of exclusion from the community, but it is not the only form.
For the employee who is the target of racial or sexual harassment on the job, one serious
harm is the loss of community, the sense of being treated not as a valued participant in the
team's joint enterprises but as a racial or sexual object.
76 See RODGERS, supra note 47, at 125-26.
77 See TERKEL, supra note 38, at xiii.
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viduals tend to resolve into the comparison of social groups.78 To
think about the crisis of work in the perspective of the constitutional
value of equality, we must look at the interactions of group status with
claims of equal liberty, that is, equal access to work.
The label "unemployed" not only locates an individual in a
group, but it also taps into a fund of meanings conventionally at-
tached to the group and its members. Consider this question: When
someone is described as unemployed, what meanings come to mind?
My own mental pictures of unemployment tend to be the faces of par-
ticular people I knew during the Depression, some of them quite close
to me. As the old black-and-white newsreel clips make clear, the faces
are not smiling. But many Americans today, asked to envision the face
of unemployment, would likely see a single mother or a young black
man. As we saw earlier, both of those faces have some statistical con-
nection with the distribution of probabilities in real life. 79 In fact, if I
had reversed this process of visualization, asking readers to envision a
young black male or a single mother, the resulting collection of
mental pictures might well have reflected the same unhappy statistics.
Abstractions invite stereotyping, the wholesale attachment of mean-
ings to social groups.
In the past generation Americans have become accustomed to
the idea that law can be used to help liberate the members of social
groups from the harmful effects of negative stereotyping. Historically,
however, American law in the main has not only reflected prevailing
group stereotypes but reinforced them, most notably in the world of
work. A clear example, by now a clich6, is the old Illinois law, embod-
ying a view of women as domestic and dependent, that limited admis-
sion to the bar to male applicants. When the Supreme Court upheld
the law's validity in 1872,80 this traditional picture of women was given
the imprimatur of the Constitution. To etch the picture even more
deeply, one Justice explicitly wrote the stereotype into a concurring
opinion. In his view, the individual qualities of Myra Bradwell, whose
application had been rejected, were irrelevant. The law's disqualifica-
tion of women from legal practice was justified, he said, because
"woman"-the abstraction that identified a group-was divinely des-
tined for the offices of wife and mother, not for the lawyer's tasks.
8'
This extreme case illustrates the vicious cycle of legal discrimina-
tion and the reinforcement of a social group's inferior status. A law
excluding women as a group from a particular kind of work is
78 An early and still valuable essay is Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group
Position, PAC. Soc. REv., Spring 1958, at 3.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
80 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
81 See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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founded on assumptions about the incapacity of women to do that
work. In turn, the law itself contributes to the social definition of the
group in two ways. First the law portrays women as unqualified; then
it denies women the opportunity to prove they can do thejob. Similar
vicious cycles were maintained by the Jim Crow laws and, even after
the demise of those laws, in the practices of public and private
employers.
Imagine that we are in a southern town in 1966. If no black per-
son has ever been a police officer in the town, then many white citi-
zens will interpret the failure of the police department to hire a black
applicant as the applicant's own failure, a "natural" result of the inca-
pacity of black people. Stereotypes have a way of perpetuating them-
selves; no one in the town will have expanded his or her collection of
mental pictures by actually having seen a black officer on the job.
But our modern civil rights legislation expresses the hope that a
similar process of acculturation can work in the opposite direction,
and to some degree the hope isjustified. Once black officers are seen
on the street and black executives are seen in the board room, once
women lawyers are seen in court and women electricians are seen at
the construction site, the social meanings of membership in groups
defined by race or sex will begin to be altered by experience. Work is
a teacher not only for the individuals who are employed but also for
others who see those individuals performing their tasks. A similar pro-
cess also operates in less positive directions, with group stereotypes
affecting job status. When a particular job is seen as "woman's work,"
for example, the job itself may well be undervalued.82
Much of America's history of race relations, and other intergroup
relations, could be written with a focus on the world of work. Today,
an author who described slavery as a form of workplace discrimination
would be understood to be indulging in irony. But the basic rationali-
zation offered for slavery was that the people who were enslaved were
inherently dependent, were not qualified for anything better-in-
deed, were not quite persons in the fullest sense. Their very enslave-
ment was offered as proof that black people as a race were, as Chief
Justice Taney said in the Dred Scott Case opinion, "an inferior class of
beings," incapable of bearing the burdens of free citizenship.8 3 This
pattern of circular rationalization is familiar even today. By the same
sophistry, women can't be "splicers" because they aren't macho
82 The job tide "secretary" lost both work responsibility and status when it came to be
applied mainly to women. See Joan Wallach Scott, The Mechanization of Women's Work, ScI.
AM., Sept. 1982, at 167, 172, 184.
83 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).
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enough.8 4 In sum, the status of a social group strongly affects the
work opportunities of the group's members, and, -in turn, the kinds of
work allowed to those members affect the group's status.
From medieval England to modern America, work has been seen
as discipline, not only in the sense of orderliness but in the sense of
government-of control. This meaning comes to the fore when we
consider the relation of work to inequalities of status among social
groups. When young American women first went "out to work" in the
textile mills, they were virtually prisoners of the job. Work rules in-
cluded rigid controls over aspects of their personal lives.85 From the
late nineteenth century onward, an employer's work rules were
treated as part of the labor contract,8 6 and immigrants who left agra-
rian lives in Europe to find work in American factories often found
those rules to be harsh taskmasters. 87 Slavery, of course, presented
the most severe issues of discipline; if white masters called their black
slaves lazy, perhaps they were imagining what their own behavior
might be if the tables were turned and they were the slaves.88 After
Emancipation, the few freedmen who managed to obtain land of their
own became living examples of the relation between opportunity and
effort. Those success stories were limited in number-not because
the freedmen lacked a work ethic, but because they lacked access to
land or to other avenues to independent earnings. The promise of
freedom was betrayed. 89
The perception of work as discipline has often been associated
with the need for taming raw nature, including the impulses of sexual-
ity.90 Seen from this perspective, locking young women in their tex-
tile-mill dormitories was only common sense, as was the separation
that enforced racial caste in the workplace in all public arenas of the
Jim Crow South. 91 In the mid-nineteenth century, Robert Wiebe tells
84 See Epstein, supra note 53, at 93-94. Some of these walls of exclusion have begun to
show cracks. For example, after a generation of hard work, women officers in the Air
Force and the Navy have been allowed to serve as combat pilots, and a female Army captain
was recently given command of a combat assault helicopter company. See Division to Get
Female Commander, HAw. TRIB.-HERALD, July 17, 1996, at 3.
85 See ALICE KESSLER-HARRiS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 37-39 (1982).
86 Cf. RODGERS, supra note 47, at 43-51.
87 See id. at 170-73.
88 Owners of large plantations who talked this way may also have been projecting on
the slaves their own habits of idleness. On the work ethic of slaves and their masters, see
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORID THE SLAVES MADE 295-324, 388-98
(1974).
89 See LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 399-
408, 446-49 (1979).
90 Cf RODGERS, supra note 47, at 99 (detailing the historical viewpoint that work is the
foundation of self-discipline).
91 SeeJOHN DouARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TowN 134-72 (1937).
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us, the cities provided "the sharpest evidence of self-perpetuating
tracks for winners and losers, '92 and those on the upper track identi-
fied the poor as "'the dangerous classes' of the cities and the contami-
nants of the towns."9 3 The fear of the out-of-control "other" was a
powerful emotion in those earlier times, and it still is:
The image or stereotype of the "welfare recipient" is the [teenage]
unmarried woman, more likely an addict, having children to get on
and stay on welfare .... The subtext is the African-American "un-
derclass" or the inhabitants of the Latino barrios. Race, ethnicity,
and religion reinforce the moral condemnation of welfare. ... Ac-
cordingly, welfare policy is deeply involved in preserving the moral
order-the work ethic, and family, gender, race, and ethnic
relations.94
In fact, most welfare mothers are in their twenties and thirties; welfare
recipients are racially diverse (about as many whites as blacks,
although the proportion of blacks is much higher); the average wel-
fare family has only one or two children; half of all these children are
pre-schoolers; and half of the adult recipients are on welfare for two
years or less.9 5 Many who leave welfare do return to it after a few years
when theirjobs disappear. Although these women are the subjects of
a good deal of moralizing that accuses them of preferring welfare over
work, the moralizers rarely trouble themselves to find out what is go-
ing on in the lives of real people who are receiving welfare benefits.96
Overwhelmingly, welfare recipients prefer to be working for pay,
97
and overwhelmingly they are working-usually "off the books" or ille-
92 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SocIEr. FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTIrrUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 330 (1984).
93 Id. at 322-28.
94 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 7, at 3-4. I have substituted "teenage" for
"young"; elsewhere, Handler and Hasenfeld make clear that this is the image they are
discussing. The authors' characterization of the popular image of welfare recipients is
supported by recent survey research. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 161-62.
95 SeeJOEL F. HANDLER, THE PovERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 46-48 (1995). Some 62% of
adult recipientsare on welfare for four years or less. At any given time, however, longer-
term recipients constitute about 65% of the total. See id. at 48-49.
96 For a recent and representative short sermon that fits this pattern, see Gertrude
Himmelfarb, Welfare as a Moral Problem, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 685 (1996). Himmel-
farb's moralizing, for all her insistence on the virtues of throwing people off of welfare and
into paid employment, is accompanied by no recognition-not any recognition at all-of
the shortage of decent-payingjobs. Whose morality should we be examining here? See also
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY: FROM VIcTORAN VIRTUES TO
MODERN VALUES (1995) (discussing Victorian values and the concept of morality).
97 See HANDLER, supra note 95, at 51-55, 83, 85. Cf. HoCHSCHILD, supra note 47, at 160-
62 (discussing work ethic among poor black Americans in general and welfare recipients in
particular).
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gally98-in order to make ends meet.99 The term welfare has outlived
its usefulness; a more descriptive term, and one less likely to reinforce
group stereotypes, would be aid to the working poor.
"The problem of welfare," in today's political rhetoric, is a racially
polarizing expression' 00 that serves to divert attention from one of the
chief causes of poverty: a lack of jobs that pay a living wage. 101 The
prevailing image of the welfare mother offers political actors the op-
portunity to link the idea of work as discipline with primordial fears of
the out-of-control "other."102 Once again, racial and sexual scapegoat-
ing is encoded in genteel-sounding appeals to the ideal values associ-
ated with work.103 The "moral order" reinforced by the politics of
welfare is indistinguishable from the age-old status order of social
groups.
For those who are employed, the workplace is one of our most
important arenas for the public interaction of social groups and the
public negotiation of group status. The long-lasting exclusion of
black, Chinese, and Japanese workers from American labor unions
represented not just the exclusion of individual applicants but the
purposeful exclusion of racial groups; the most desirable industrial
98 See, e.g., Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RETHINKING SO-
CIAL POLICY. RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UPPERCLASS, supra note 6, at 204-35 (outlining an in-
depth study of fifty welfare matters in the Chicago area). See also Handler & Hasenfeld,
supra note 7, at 106-11 (summarizing the similar findings of a number of studies in other
cities).
99 Finding and keeping any job can itself be quite ajob if you are a single mother with
no resources, no child care, and little education. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking
"Welfare Dependency"ftom a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961 passim (1993). The stories
told in this Article should be required reading for our self-appointed instructors in Virtue
101.
Adult welfare recipients also spend a great deal of time in unpaid work outside the
home to keep their families afloat. This includes time spent seeking to qualify for public
medical care for their children, making repeated visits to welfare offices to jump through
bureaucratic hoops, and calling on relatives for various kinds of aid. See CAROL B. STACK,
ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNIY passim (1974) (exploring
strategies and systems poor African-American families use to cope with poverty in their
daily lives).
100 SeeJILL. QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON
POVERTY 175-77 (1994).
101 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 7, passim.
102 I have previously discussed Vice President Dan Quayle's sortie into this territory in
the 1992 presidential election. See KARST, supra note 35, at 137-46.
103 Anglo-American law has always treated relief for the poor as a means of controlling
"deviance," distinguishing between the "deserving" poor, who need not work in order to
receive support, and the "undeserving" poor, who must be forced to work. In America, the
term "undeserving" has been, to a distressing degree, associated with persons of darker
skin color. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 95, at 10-31. For recent discussions of this pattern
in application to women of color, see Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender:
Judicial lmages of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLAWoMEN'S LJ. 457, 486-95 (1996);
Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legis-
lation Debate, 22 FoRDHAm URs. L.J. 1159, 1163-68 (1995).
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jobs, union leaders repeatedly said, must be a white preserve.10 4 In
our time, racial or sexual harassment on the job not only demeans
individual employees, but it also reinforces the view that the members
of a minority race in general, or women in general, are not worthy to
be full participants in the workplace community.
10 5
The workplace is also an arena in which employers, private as well
as public, can intensify intergroup conflict. Ronald Takaki has shown
how plantation owners in Hawaii, by playing one ethnic group of
workers against another, were able to minimize the likelihood that
strikes would succeed.10 6 More generally, politicians have learned
that appeals to racial and ethnic antagonisms are an effective "divide
and conquer" technique, and that anxieties about employment are
especially susceptible to this kind of manipulation. Once any political
contest is sharply defined as a struggle between two groups for status
domination, the minority loses, for status domination is always a zero-
sum game. Jim Crow originated in just such a political use of racial
scapegoating, 10 7 and in the New Deal era, considerations of race pro-
duced the exclusion of agricultural work from both Social Security
and the minimum wage.10 8 In our own time, television images are an
effective way for political operatives to link racial antagonisms to inse-
curities about work. The technique has been central to the "social
issues agenda" that played such an important role in the realignment
of working class whites in presidential campaigns from 1968 through
1988.109
Today, one work-related issue that serves a similar political pur-
pose, particularly as to race relations but also as to the relations be-
104 See, e.g., Herbert Hill, Race and Ethnicity in Organized Labor: The Historical Sources of
Resistance to Affirmative Action, 12 J. INTERGROUP REL. 5, 7-9 (Winter 1984).
105 This group harm can be caused by "nondirected" racial or sexual slurs; for exam-
ple, the posting of pinup pictures on the walls of the workplace without the targeting of
any particular women. For the view that this kind of nondirected speech, in contrast with
targeted slurs, is protected by the First Amendment, see Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom
of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Ray. 1791, 1843-72 (1992).
106 See Ronald Takaki, Ethnicity and Class in Hawaii: The Plantation Labor Experience,
1835-1920, in LABOR DIVIDED: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN UNITED STATES LABOR STRUGGLES,
1835-1960, at 33, 35-37 (Robert Asher & Charles Stephenson eds., 1990). For a more gen-
eralized discussion of ethnic rivalry as an impediment to unionization, see Suzanne Model,
The Ethnic Niche and the Structure of Opportunity: Immigrants and Minorities in New York City, in
THE "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE: VIEWS FROM HISTORY 161, 167-68 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993).
107 The classic account is C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW 67-
109 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
108 William Forbath notes the failure of black workers to share in the New Deal in his
insightful analysis of the interplay of racial caste and economic class from Reconstruction
to the present. See William E. Forbath, Race, Class, and Equal Citizenship, in MORAL
PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN LIFE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL HISTORY (Karen Halttunen &
Lewis Perry eds., forthcoming 1997) (essays in honor of David Brion Davis).
109 On the role of race in the "social issues agenda," see KAtsr, supra note 35, at 67-
111. On the zero-sum game of status domination, see id. at 14-15.
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tween women and men, is affirmative action. With so many American
workers afraid they will fall out of the middle class, the climate is right
for scapegoating. What has changed is the rhetoric. White American
men have been reacculturated at least to this extent: now most do not
want to think of themselves as racist or sexist. 10 The political appeal
of the attack on affirmative action is enhanced because it is cast in the
language of neutrality, while affirmative action is .called "reverse
discrimination." 'u l
The appeal is considerable. The Governor of California, hoping
to revitalize a dying presidential campaign, led a successful assault in
1995 on affirmative action at the University of California. 1 2 And next
week the voters of California seem sure to adopt an initiative amend-
ment to the state constitution that will forbid all state agencies from
engaging in affirmative action, particularly in the area of employ-
ment."13 What should give the supporters of affirmative action pause,
l1O A few politicians still prefer the old style of scapegoating. David Duke, ex-
Klansman/Naziphile-cum-facelift and perennial seeker of high office, suggested after the
mysterious 1996 explosion of an airliner that affirmative action jeopardizes airline safety by
putting "less qualified" workers into jobs. See Kevin McGill, Ex-Klansman Tries to Regain
Political Legitimacy, HAW. TR .-HERALD, July 29, 1996, at 2. Duke finished fourth in Louisi-
ana's 1996 open primary vote for a U.S. Senate seat, receiving a little over 10% of the vote.
See Adam Nossiter, A Crowded Primary Sets Up A Classic Battle of Contrasts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1996, at A12.
111 On white resentment, see DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DMDED By
COLOR: RAcIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS passim (1996) (examining, along racial
lines, the reasons behind Americans' opinions on various policies including affirmative
action, school desegregation, and welfare reform, and concluding that whites' racial re-
sentment 1) creates imagined racial threats, 2) fuels their belief that affirmative action
threatens their collective interest, and 3) extends to issues as diverse as welfare, capital
punishment, sexual harassment, gay rights, and immigration).
112 See Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, UC Regents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative
Action, L.A TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al.
113 I have left the text as it was when this lecture was given. The voters did adopt the
proposed amendment, by a 54%-46% vote. See State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, atA29.
Well before the California vote, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court sharply limited
state and federal governmental affirmative action programs in the areas of hiring and gov-
ernment contracting. Still, the Court has left the constitutional door open to affirmative
action when governmental actors have a persuasive reason for concluding that their pro-
grams are needed to remedy the present effects of past racial discrimination or sex discrim-
ination. On government employment, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
270-74, 283-84 (1986) (invalidating a preferential collective bargaining agreement layoff-
provision for being too intrusive a solution after noting the Court's past insistence on both
a showing of prior discrimination by the government unit involved and a narrowly tailored
means of remedying the discrimination); id. at 284, 286, 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that although the layoff provision is not narrowly tailored to effectuate its remedial
purpose, nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses the possibility that the Court will find
governmental interests sufficient to sustain affirmative action policies). On government
contracting, see Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78, 509-11 (1989) (hold-
ing unconstitutional the city of Richmond's plan requiring contractors for city projects to
subcontract 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to businesses controlled primarily by
minority owners, but acknowledging that the city could remedy past discrimination in the
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and I include myself, is that in an opinion poll of likely voters taken
shortly before the vote, substantial numbers of black (thirty-seven per-
cent) and Latino (thirty-eight percent) Californians supported the
ballot proposition. 114 The "Latino vote" in California typically in-
cludes a substantial element that is politically conservative. 115 No
doubt some of the black supporters believe the existence of affirma-
tive action programs will cause their own achievements to be dis-
counted. 116 Others, however, may share in a larger attitude shift, the
increasing despair of middle-class black Americans over the possibili-
ties of full integration into our public life.
117
Given the combination of white male resentment and black disil-
lusionment, race-based affirmative action in government employment
granting of contracts if it identified the discrimination with sufficient particularity);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2110-12, 2117 (1995) (extending the
strict scrutiny analysis of Croson to federal government contracts and reassuring govern-
mental units that strict scrutiny is not fatal and that they may still act in response to past
discrimination). Justices Scalia and Thomas would adopt the goal of the proposed Califor-
nia constitutional amendment as federal constitutional doctrine, completely forbidding
affirmative action except as a remedy for highly particularized past discrimination by the
governmental actor in question. See id. at 2118, 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Gins-
burg pointed out that a substantial majority of the Justices disagreed with this view. See id.
at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 See Dan Morain, Proposition 209 Still Holding Strong Lead, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1996,
at Al. An exit poll showed 26% of black voters and 24% of Latino voters in favor of the
proposition. See State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, supra note 113, at A29.
115 In 1964 Latinos in California voted overwhelmingly for "Proposition 14," which
amended the state constitution to forbid open housing legislation-a measure later held
unconstitutional in Reitman v. Mulky, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In the Latino communities,
voting is heavily weighted toward the middle class. In 1984, exit polls in California gave
President Reagan up to 42% of Latino votes. See PETER SKERRY, MExCAN AMERICANS: THE
AMBIVALENT MINORITY 233-34 (1993).
116 For thoughtful analyses of this concern, see generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLEC-
TIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (1986).
117 See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QuEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987) (exploring the historical legal obstacles to racial equality in the United
States); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992) (arguing that African-Americans will never gain full equality and that the goal of
social equality is illusory for them).
On the greater levels of dissatisfaction among middle-class black Americans, see
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 47, at 55-153. One explanation for this higher level of disillusion-
ment is that middle class blacks have enough day-to-day contact with whites to see the
effects of discrimination in their own lives. See id. at 73. Another reason, though, surely
rests in justifiable resentment of the stereotyping that, in the minds of many white Ameri-
cans, seems to attach fears (e.g., fears of crime) to all black people. A famous story illus-
trating this fear is Patricia Williams's account of a white clerk in an upscale store who
would not open the door to Williams, a black woman professional. See PATRICIA J. Wit,
LIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991). Some white readers have been
unimpressed by this story, but I know several middle-class black people who see it as similar
to their own experiences.
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seems likely to decline. 1 8 The sad reality is that this development will
be largely irrelevant to black Americans at the lowest levels of the so-
cioeconomic scale. 119 These people were among the first to be hurt
by the shortage of decentjobs, 120 and they remain the hardest-hit of
all.12' At the next highest level of employment, too, women and mem-
bers of racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately repre-
sented among temporary workers. 122 In every crisis of work in
America, the poor who have suffered most have been members of
these groups. They have also felt the sting of group subordination in
dimensions of their lives beyond employment. With the deterioration
of many institutions that used to offer structure to society in the cen-
tral cities, unemployment, especially among young black men, has be-
come associated with all manner of social ills that, in the aggregate,
translate into a sense of hopelessness.' 23 If "the American Dream" is a
collective belief in the rewards of work,124 hopelessness is its exact
antithesis.
This demoralization does not represent a rejection of the positive
values associated with work; rather, it indicates how completely the
values of work have been absorbed by those who have been marginal-
ized. For people in despair, a common sequel is alienation. When
members of a social group become conscious that they, as a group, are
118 See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 893 (1994) (contending that affirmative action will fade because of its practical and
political limits).
Private employers, in contrast, will probably continue to adopt programs of affirmative
action as "anticipatory remedies" to avoid lawsuits or administrative proceedings founded
on charges of past discrimination. And because affirmative action programs for women
have caused less resentment than race-based programs, they seem likely to survive even
among governmental employers, unless they fall victim to omnibus anti-affirmative-action
legislation similar to the impending amendment to the California Constitution.
119 This development is not entirely irrelevant for potential workers at the lowest wage
levels, but the results are not encouraging for affirmative action advocates. See JENcgs,
supra note 6, at 49-58.
120 For an analysis of the factors that have contributed to unemployment among work-
ing-class black Americans, see William Julius Wilson's valuable but unfortunately titied
book, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INST=U-
TnONS (2d ed. 1980). For a more recent sorting of factors in thejoblessness of urban black
men living below the poverty line and an evaluation of possible remedies, see E. Douglass
Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting America to Work" in the Inner City, 81
Gao. LJ. 2003 (1993).
121 SeeJENcKs, supra note 6, at 49-58.
122 See Carr6, supra note 15, at 50; Nollen, supra note 11, at 570. Of course these cate-
gories can overlap; a woman of Puerto Rican ancestry might bear all three descriptive
labels.
123 SeeJENcKs, supra note 6, at 143-203; THE URBAN UNDERCLASS passim (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); WILuAMJuIUs WILSON, THE TRULY DIsADvrrAcaD:
THE INNER Crrv, THE UPPERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY passim (1987); RobertJ. Sampson,
Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and Family Disruption, 93 AM. J. Soc. 348
(1987).
124 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 47, at 16-24.
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being denied equal access to decent work, they will see themselves
standing outside the larger community. So, the world of work pro-
vides its own illustration that the American ideal of equality is linked
not only to liberty but also to national union.
III
UNION: WORK AND THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATION
From the earliest days of American nationhood, a free citizen has
been able to claim a right of geographical mobility. In a single section
of the Constitution, 12 5 the framers drew an explicit line between free
labor and slave labor. The Fugitive Slave Clause contemplated that a
slave who escaped to a free state would be forcibly returned to bond-
age. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, on the other hand, pro-
tected a free citizen's right to move from one state to another and to
be afforded, among other privileges, the right to work in the new state
on the same terms as local citizens. 126 Formation of an economic
union, after all, was the chief motivation for the Constitutional Con-
vention and one of the easiest matters for the Convention to re-
solve.' 27 As we have seen, work and its rewards can also lead to social
advancement. The two forms of mobility can complement each other:
Citizen Giannini may move away in order to move up, while Citizen
O'Malley's rise in fortunes may provide the independence that allows
a move to a new state. Many things have changed in 200 years, but we
still understand the relationships between freedom and these two
forms of mobility. As interpreted by the modem Supreme Court, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause retains its -youthful vigor as a safe-
guard for the interstate mobility of workers, 128 and those decisions are
commendable.
125 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
126 This Clause was adapted from the Articles of Confederation of 1781. It received
the interpretation stated in the text as early as Corfield v. Coryell 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
127 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5-8,
45-47 (1913).
128 See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (nullifying a New
Hampshire restriction limiting membership in the state bar to state residents after finding
no substantial reason to discriminate against a non-resident attorney); United Bldg. & Con-
str. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (holding that a municipal
ordinance that discriminates against nonresidents of a city, rather than a state, falls within
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and remanding for determination of whether the
city had a substantial reason to discriminate in its requirement that 40% of contractors,
subcontractors, and their employees working on city projects be residents of the city);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (invalidating an Alaska statute requiring, in oil and
gas leases and oil pipeline permits to which the state is a party, a contractual provision for
preferential hiring of qualified Alaska residents over nonresidents).
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This Clause is one arguable source of the constitutional right to
travel, 29 but other parts of the constitutional text have also been iden-
tified as sources of the same right.'30 Surely, though, Justice Brennan
is correct in saying that no particular textual source is required, for
the right is implicit in our national union.' 3 ' Whether or not the
right to travel should be limited to a right to migrate, interstate migra-
tion lies at the heart of the right. Typically, Americans migrate with
the intention of taking employment in their destination states, and
today a central object of the right to travel is freedom of access to
work in an employment market that is national in scope.
From a broader constitutional perspective, both the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the right to travel promote not only eco-
nomic integration but political integration. 3 2 If the privilege of free
and equal access to work-"the pursuit of a common calling"-is con-
sidered "fundamental" to the preservation of the American union,' 33
the reason is that work is vital to the independence of the individual
both in the economic dimension and other dimensions of his or her
life. Jonathan Varat has pointed out that this freedom of personal
mobility-precisely because of its importance to a "range of personal
life-defining liberties"-is of even greater concern to "political unifica-
tion and personal liberty" than it is to national economic union.'1" As
this profound observation makes clear, the values of union and equal
liberty come together in cementing the individual's sense of belong-
ing.13 5 Work, and the employment market where work is negotiated,
are fields of action in which both workers' freedom and workers' alle-
giance are played out.
The union of the American people is a constitutional value of the
first importance. This interest in political union has been described
as an interest of the people that "weighs against a policy" of govern-
ment that is highly likely to precipitate caste divisions and thus disrupt
129 Indeed, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is the source, according
to Justice O'Connor. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71, 73-74 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
130 See Kenneth L. Karst, Right to Trave in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 1593, 1593-94 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (identifying the Commerce Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause as additional sources of the constitutional right to travel).
131 See Zobe4 457 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132 SeeJonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 518-19 (1981).
133 See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Counci4 465 U.S. at 219.
134 See Jonathan D. Varat, Economic Integration and Interregional Migration in the United
States Federal System, in COMPARATVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 21,
30-31 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990).
135 In 1830, in one of his most famous speeches opposing slavery, Daniel Webster in-
sisted on the same linkage: "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!"
THE OxFoRD DicIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 725:6 (Angela Partington ed., rev. 4th ed. 1996)
(quoting from the Second Speech in the Senate on Foote's Resolution).
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the unity of the whole people. 136 But the tasks of preserving the
union and avoiding the subordination of caste typically will require
the positive energies of government-for example, assuring sufficient
funds for the education of all children, 3 7 or creating jobs in a time of
severe unemployment.'38 In a community of equal citizens, responsi-
bility goes beyond the obligations of law. Citizens have moral and
political obligations to each other.
The national community, like any other community, carries with
it a state of mind, a widely shared belief that "we are in this together."
A sense of community needs continual nourishment, whether that
community be a family, a neighborhood, or a nation. And, although
the sense of obligation within a community may result in altruistic be-
havior, the nourishment cannot always run in one direction. No one
maintains allegiance indefinitely without some sense that "there is
something in it for me." True, the "something" can be intangible,
but, usually, even the intangibles are reciprocal. Only a rare and
saintly person goes on giving forever, with no hope of any payoff.
It is easy to see the relevance of these requisites of community
allegiance to race relations in America. Recent calls for black separa-
tism, for example, seem to express the growing pessimism among
black Americans about the chances for group status equality. 3 9 One
area of American life in which the effects of racial caste are still to be
found is the world of work. A genuine equality of access to stable jobs
for black Americans would not only help to neutralize the racial hue
that has been cast on a welfare system designed to stigmatize, 14° but
would also promote political unity by reducing the alienation that
feeds on exclusion.
Historically, the workplace has been not only a field of ethnic
conflict but also a source of social integration. Immigrants, from Asia
and Latin America as well as Europe, have found work to be a place of
learning, not only of job-related skills but of American English and
136 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Governmen 41 UCLA, L.
REv. 1297, 1300 (1994). Eisgruber's "whimsical example" of an unconstitutional policy is
the granting of a title of nobility in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 or § 10. See id. at
1301-04.
137 In San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, Justice Powell's majority opinion
strongly hinted that there would be a serious constitutional problem with a public school
system that excluded children too poor to pay tuition. 411 U.S. 1, 25 n.60 (1973). See also
Justice Brennan's comment in Plyler v. Doe, discussed supra text accompanying note 57.
138 Examples can be found in various work programs of the New Deal.
139 See generally HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRrrIcAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND
MINORrnEs AND AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCI-Y (1987) (documenting the rise and the waning
of the civil rights movement and advocating the establishment of an independent African-
American political party as a means of promoting group political, cultural, and economic
survival).
140 See supra text accompanying note 94.
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other aspects of the American culture.141 True, the interaction of eth-
nic groups in the context of work has often been contentious and
sometimes violent.142 But, by a group's third generation in America,
high levels of social integration are the norm. The dominant factor in
achieving both racial and ethnic integration has been economic ad-
vance, the entry of various outsider groups into the middle class.
143
One index of integration is intergroup marriage; when the great ma-
jority of a group's members attain middle class status, marriage
outside the group increases dramatically. Recent illustrations are the
out-marriage patterns among American Jews and Japanese Ameri-
cans.' 44 Access to work is an indispensable ingredient of a group's
integration. 145
The world of work, then, offers vivid evidence of the connections
between group status equality and national union-or, conversely, the
links between inequality and disunion. In the field of work the crucial
links in these two circles, benign and vicious, are inclusion or exclu-
sion.146 Three decades ago, a distinguished national commission cap-
tured the economic and social separation of black and white
Americans by calling the races "two societies"; 47 a substantial racial
differential in access to work was identified by the commission as both
indicator and cause.' 48 Today it is more obvious than it was in 1968
that the "two societies" label oversimplifies, failing to account for the
141 For a discussion of the adaptation of European immigrants to industrialization, see
RODGERS, supra note 47, at 170-73. The immigrant who arrived without friends or indus-
trial skills "often went through the painful shock of unemployment followed by entrap-
ment in a brutal round of temporaryjobs." Id. at 172.
142 See, e.g., ADRIAN COOK, THE ARMIES OF THE STREETS: THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFrT
RIOTS OF 1863 (1974) (discussing antiblack violence which occurred partly in response to
competition from black workers); MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 149
(1960) (discussing violence against Catholics in Massachusetts reflecting resentment over
Irish workers taking work as brickmakers); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY.
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 205-13 (1971) (discussing violence
against Chinese workers).
143 See Richard D. Alba, Assimilation's Quiet Tide, 119 PuB. INTEREST, Spring 1995, at 3,
5-6; Kenneth L. Karst, Does Integration Have a Future., in CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY
POLmCS, AND THE LAw (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., forthcoming 1997).
144 See HARRY H.L. KrrANO & ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICANS: EMERGING MINORITIES
177 (1988) (reporting that in 1984, 51.2% ofJapanese Americans married in Los Angeles
County married someone outside the "race"); Jill Smolowe, Intermarried ... with Children,
TIME, Fall 1993, at 64 ("AmongJapanese Americans, 65% marry people who have noJapa-
nese heritage"); Larry B. Stammer, Reform Judaism Links Its Future to Change, LA. TIMES,
June 17, 1995, at B4 (52% ofJews married outside the faith from 1985 to 1990).
145 By integration I do not mean the erasure of cultural difference; I mean inclusion,
by offering the choice to participate fully in all aspects of our public life. See Karst, supra
note 143.
146 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316-17 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
147 REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
148 See id. at 10-14.
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many millions of Americans who identify themselves as neither black
nor white. As a characterization of black/white relations, however,
the concept of "two societies" retains considerable validity.149 A gen-
eration of advance for the one-third of black Americans who are now
in the middle class is something to applaud, but the applause is muf-
fled when we consider the nearly one-third of black Americans who
live in poverty-or move in and out of poverty, as unemployment
levels wax and wane.150 Until that number is drastically reduced, we
must speak of a national community in the vocabulary of hope.
Race is by no means the only contributor to the group division
that threatens national union in our increasingly "split society."' 51
This term refers to the division with which we began: A majority of
Americans have access to employment at decent wages and, through
that employment, access to family security benefits. A smaller but
growing number of Americans lack decently remunerative pay and
also lack the essentials of family security. This latter group is growing
and seems likely to continue growing for years to come.152 Yet, for the
most part, those who make the nation's employment policy are look-
ing in other directions.
We confront a social Great Divide, one that endangers the union
of citizens that is the foundation of our constitutional order. To those
who say, "It can't happen here," I commend a 1935 novel by that very
title. 153 In the novel, of course, it did happen: a coup was organized
by the elite after the election of a demagogue as President-a man
who looked very much like Huey Long. An alternative response to
widespread disorder might be a regime of "friendly fascism," all
decked out in red, white, and blue.154 President Franklin Roosevelt
came to understand that it could happen here. He saw the New Deal
as a program that would preserve the blessings of economic freedom
in the face of attack from radical quarters on the left and right. 55
149 Andrew Hacker appropriated the essence of the expression for the tide of his 1992
book, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL. See HACKER, supra
note 6. His discussion of race and employment supports his choice of tide. See id. at 107-
18.
150 See id. at 93-103; Holmes, supra note 25.
151 Bellin & Miller, supra note 32, at 173.
152 See id. at 173-81; Thurow, supra note 5, at 56-57. There is nothing "natural" about
this projection and nothing inevitable either. Government has the power to shape these
developments. The more somber question is whether comfortable Americans, a term that
embraces all our policymakers, will have the will to do so. See id. at 189-90.
153 SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE (1935).
154 I have taken the term from BERTRAM GROSS, FRIENDLY FASCISM: THE NEW FACE OF
POWER IN AMERICA (1980), but I have in mind something more akin to the Italian and
German versions of fascism that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s.
155 This awareness crystallized in 1935, and resulted in "the second New Deal." See
AN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FORJUSTICE: SoCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE 360,
394 (1991); ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA 1929-1941, at 258-63
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Today's policymakers should ponder the relevance of Roosevelt's acu-
men to their own responsibilities.
IV
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO WORK?
Although it is instructive to look at work and unemployment
from the constitutional perspectives of liberty, equality, and national
union, I do not suggest that American courts are capable of enforcing
a constitutional right to stable and adequately compensated work.
William Forbath, after illuminating the moral force and sophistication
of the nineteenth century advocates who claimed such a right, has
powerfully argued for recognition of the right in our own time.156 He
makes clear, however, that he does not place responsibility for vindi-
cating this right on the courts. Rather, he looks to Congress and to
the state legislatures. 57 I agree that American lawmakers can and
should contribute to a national effort to head off the impending crisis
of work. Any effective contribution will include a conscious effort to
expand the social definitions of work.'5 8 To understand the difficulty
of accomplishing even that task, we need to examine why it is that the
courts are incapable of enforcing a generalized constitutional right to
decent work.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the judiciary
could have promoted a more generous view of the freedom to work
simply by upholding laws designed to expand workers' range of free
choice. When advocates asserted a right to decent work, they mainly
asked the courts for removal of the judicial veto, not the recognition
(1984); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE PoLrIcs OF UPHEAVAL
392-408 (1960). Roosevelt, of course, could not anticipate David Duke, but he did know
about Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin.
156 See Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 67, at 1790-92. See also Forbath, Free Labor, supra
note 67, at 800-14. For an analogous argument, deriving a right to labor protest not only
from the First Amendment but from the Thirteenth Amendment and from "republican
free labor" ideals, see James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindus-
trialization, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1071, 1096-112 (1987).
157 SeeForbath, Rights Tak, supranote 67, at 1776-78, 1785-87, 1797-1800. Forbath also
references "constitutional innovations by Congress" and "a non-court centered constitu-
tional theory." Id. at 1777. A similar view of Congress's constitutional obligation, founded
on section two of the Thirteenth Amendment, is expressed in Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres
and a Mue: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 39-43
(1990).
Judith Shklar, who argues for philosophical recognition of a right to work, adds:
It may not be a constitutional right or one that the courts should enforce,
but it should be a presumption guiding our policies. Instead of being re-
garded as just one interest among others, it ought to enjoy the primacy that
a right may claim in any conflict of political priorities.
SHKAR, supra note 48, at 99 (foomote omitted).
158 See infra Part V.
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of an enforceable right of guaranteed employment. 5 9 If enforcement
of such a right would have been difficult a century ago, the crisis of
work in our time will confront any would-be judicial Solon with insur-
mountable obstacles. The problems lie not only in the application of
remedies but in the definition of substantive claims.
Judicial remedies, even sweeping remedies, are readily conceived
when the courts have a clear idea of what constitutes wrongdoing, and
who is doing the wrong. Jim Crow was an all-pervading social system,
but the basic wrong of racial subordination through race-based exclu-
sion was easy to see for anyone who was looking.160 The wrong-the
constitutional wrong-was committed not only by officers of govern-
ment but by nongovernmental actors who controlled access to ele-
ments of "the public life of the community,"161 and especially the
public world of work.162 When the wrong consists of exclusion, one
obvious remedy is to order an end to the exclusion. In furtherance of
this end, a positive command to desegregate the workplace is appro-
priate. 163 Affirmative remedies for employment discrimination were
developed early in the Supreme Court's interpretations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and have become a standard part of the
judiciary's remedial repertoire. 6 4
So, when I speak of insuperable obstacles to judicial enforcement
of a constitutional right to decent work, I am not talking about the
"state action" limitation that was made by judges and could be un-
made by them. Nor am I assuming some inherent limitation on
courts' capacities to develop affirmative remedies. 16 5 Both of those
presumed obstacles are quite surmountable. Rather, the chief diffi-
culties lie in the superabundance of causes for the harm ofjoblessness
in today's economy. This diffusion of responsibility seriously compli-
159 See Forbath, Free Labor, supra note 67, at 775-800, 805-06.
160 Even after all these years, the best exposition of this point remains Charles L. Black,
Jr.'s powerful essay, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
161 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 101 (1967).
162 See Karst, supra note 65, at 5-11.
163 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
An analogy outside the world of work may be helpful here. If Congress had not en-
acted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, there would be nothing amiss in a "judicial activism"
that developed affirmative remedies for violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
164 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). When a later majority of
the Court undermined this remedy, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), Congress shored it up in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991. See Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
165 Such remedies are by no means a modem invention. See Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HIARv. L.
REv. 465, 465-67 (1980). See also Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86YALE LJ. 1103 (1977) (trac-
ing and evaluating federal courts' misplaced reliance on old doctrines of equity to limit the
availability of injunctions in federal courts).
[Vol. 82:523
CRISIS OF WORK
cates not only the identification of particular defendants and the craft-
ing of judicial remedies, but also the definition of the wrong.
Consider, for example, the multifaceted question of temporary
and part-time work. 166 A great many workers who occupy these jobs
surely would prefer steady, full-time work, not only for job security
and better incomes, but also for the health care and pension benefits
that are so vital to family security.167 What is the wrong here? Who is
the wrongdoer? What remedial action should a court command? To
the extent that underemployment is aggravated by low wages in a
global labor market, most of that factor lies beyond, any American
judge's writ. But, even if we could put aside the effects of the "new
world order" on American jobs, and even if we could particularize re-
sponsibility for underemployment in some cases, the dimensions of a
right to decent work would remain elusive. Unlike the constitutional
litigation that invalidated the Jim Crow laws (or even statute-based liti-
gation against private employers who practice racial discrimination),
litigation to enforce a right to decent work does not offer the prospect
of standardized lawsuits, against standardized defendants, with de-
mands for standardized forms of relief. True, if a company should
persist in using temporary or part-time help to avoid the costs of
health and pension benefits, it would be easy to specify a standard
remedy: a court could order the company to stop. But, even in so
simple a case, the attempt to define the contours of the right would
lead the courts deep into a question that turns the "liberty of contract"
issue of the early twentieth century upside down: How much market
freedom must give way to the freedom of access to work? Or, to put it
more starkly, in which particulars is capitalism unconstitutional? This
thicket of political economy makes the "political thicket" of legislative
reapportionment look like a stroll in the park.
168
166 Here I draw heavily on the work ofJoel Handler, see HANDLER, supra note 95, at 42-
44; Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 7, and on Gillian Lester's research on the subject, as
yet unpublished.
167 Estimates vary as to the proportion of temporary or contingent workers who would
prefer permanent work, but a majority appear to do so. See Developments in the Law: Employ-
ment Discrimination, supra note 10, at 1651 n.24. On the other hand, some surveys indicate
that a majority of part-time workers say they are holding those jobs voluntarily. It is hard to
estimate the degree of actual choice being exercised here, given the parlous state of child
care, the costs of transportation, and widespread awareness of the shortage of full-time
jobs. See HANDLER, supra note 95, at 43.
168 Speaking of reapportionment, Justice Felix Frankfurter said, "Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket." Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality
opinion).
Plainly, a court that declined to find a "comparable worth" requirement in Titie VII's
general prohibition of sex discrimination is not about to enter the thicket of fair distribu-
tion of work. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183-84 (1981) (Rehn-




The prospect of a prolonged scarcity of decent jobs makes the
definition of a constitutional freedom to work even more difficult.
For example, one response to the job shortage may be part-time work
itself, or, to use a more positive term, job sharing. Such a program
would seek to lower the number of hours worked by individual work-
ers in order to employ more of them-but if that were the end of the
matter, there would be no solution at all. We can imagine the adver-
tising slogan of the company that systematically hires temporary and
part-time workers and consistently refuses to provide them with health
or pension benefits: "Do people care about joblessness? People
do."169 A further sharing of jobs that simply spreads around the ef-
fects of underemployment will only intensify the crisis of work. To
lower hours while assuring the expanded work force of health care
and pension benefits does not seem beyond human ingenuity. But
imposing that remedy on private employers as an implication of a
right to decent work would involve judges in constitutionalizing one
specific, yet incomplete, solution from among myriad possible re-
sponses to the harms of underemployment. Alternative proposals
have included a variety of combinations of governmental provision,
tax subsidy, or mandated health care or retirement benefits. 70 If ever
there were a place for heeding Lon Fuller's advice to leave "polycen-
tric" problems to legislative solutions, this is it.'71
Can an analogous constitutional duty be enforced against agen-
cies of government? The model, arguably, would be those school. de-
segregation cases in which school boards were ordered to bring into
court their own plans for desegregating. 17 2 By analogy, a right to ac-
cess to work might be enforced by commanding government officials
to offer plans for the relief of the harms of unemployment and under-
employment. The advantage here would be that the initial choices
among the wide range of possible actions would emerge from a polit-
ical (administrative and legislative) process, with the courts limited to
a veto power. Some years ago I suggested something similar as a way
of prodding political action to alleviate the worst effects of marginaliz-
169 I refer here to the environmentalist hymns in recent advertising by an oil company
that for twenty years dumped pollutants into the ocean off Catalina Island. Do people
indulge in hypocrisy? People do.
170 See infra text accompanying note 189.
171 SeeLon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HaRv. L REv. 353, 394-404
(1978).
172 See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (holding that district
courts have an obligation to assess the effectiveness of a school district's proposed desegre-
gation plan and to retain jurisdiction until it is clear that segregation has completely disap-
peared); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Braxton, 402 F.2d 900, 901-02, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1968)
(rejecting a school district's challenge to a court-compelled provision of a desegregation
plan and remanding to the district court to reconsider the school board's entire plan pur-
suant to the requirements set forth in Green).
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ing poverty on black Americans in our central cities. Even this propo-
sal, I conceded, would press the courts toward the outer limits of their
capacities. 173 What is different about the crisis of work we now face is
not only the greater diffusion of harms and the greater difficulty in
particularizing causes ofjoblessness, 174 but the heightened influence
of a factor-the global labor market-that a defendant public agency
will find hard to govern. Considerations like these should not be
taken by legislators as a counsel of despair,175 but for judges they are a
counsel of modesty.
The idea of a right to work at a living wage, backstopped by the
health and pension benefits needed for family security, unquestiona-
bly resounds with our constitutional values of liberty, equal citizen-
ship, and national union. But if the courts are not going to enforce
the right-and, certainly, they are not' 7 6-then they should not de-
clare it to be a constitutional right. Even the "Constitution of aspira-
tion," to the extent that it encompasses more than pleas for the courts
to recognize new rights and enforce them, is a set of political claims
resonating against various constitutional guarantees that are en-
forced-a political "penumbra," if you will.177 True, judges do try to
mobilize citizen respect for constitutional values by articulating those
values in opinions, but the hallmark of a judicially recognized consti-
tutional ight is that it will be enforced-that if the right be denied, a
court will supply a remedy. This is what lawyers and lay observers usu-
ally have in mind when they talk of constitutional rights. 178 It is not
173 See Karst, supra note 48, at 37-49. For a more recent articulation of the difficulties,
see Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410, 420-22, 429-33 (1993). Professor Sager and I both identified Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), as a prototype of a proper case for judicial intervention.
174 See Bellin & Miller, supra note 32, at 174-77; Williams & Sander, supra note 120, at
2013-42.
175 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
176 A decade ago, Charles Black made an eloquent appeal for recognition of a consti-
tutional right to the basic necessities of livelihood. He mainly envisioned a duty of the
President and Congress to act effectively to keep Americans out of poverty. He did not
expect much help from judges: "The courts probably cannot do very much herein-cer-
tainly not enough-though perhaps we will know more about this later, through trial."
Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
Rv. 1103, 1107 (1986).
177 See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us
A//"74J. AM. Hisr. 1013, 1020, 1025 (1987). Robin West takes up a similar theme, with
emphasis on the responsibilities of Congress to give reality to the Constitution's guarantees
of liberty and equality. See Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 241
(1993). For critiques of West's argument, see Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 269, 269-77 (1993); Anthony E. Cook, Comment on Professor Robin West's
Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 278, 278-82 (1993); Sanford Levison, Parlia-
mentarianism, Progressivism and 1937: Some Reservations About Professor West's Aspirational
Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. Rv. 283, 283-95 (1993).
178 Lawrence Sager thoughtfully explored these boundary regions in his article, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
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something to be left to political negotiation; that sort of abdication,
after all, was the most grievous error in "all deliberate speed."' 79
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of liberty and equal
citizenship, however, do have their own legislative-power "penum-
bras," with a clear textual basis in Congress's power to enforce the
amendment "by appropriate legislation.'18 0 This power has been in-
terpreted generously by the Supreme Court in the field of voting
rights legislation, 8 1 and a similar generosity ought to extend to con-
gressional laws to promote a right to remunerative work. Access to
work, we have seen, is an individual liberty of major importance, and
equal access to work has a comparable importance for individuals' en-
joyment of equal citizenship, which typically turns on the status of
groups. Surely Congress can promote this liberty and this equality,
not only in the name of the commerce and spending powers, 8 2 but
also in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment power. In the next Part
we examine some legislative proposals along these lines.'83
It is entirely appropriate to refer to such legislation as the en-
forcement of a constitutional right. But the claim of a constitutional
status for a right of access to work ought to be left to Congress, to the
President, to other political actors, and to commentators on the Con-
stitution. In 1941 Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met on
Some constitutional norms, he said, are underenforced by the judiciary for reasons related
not to the substance of the norms but to perceived limitations ofjudicial capacity or of the
courts' legitimate role in the governmental system. See id. at 1213-20. He concluded that
"the unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have the full status of positive
law which we generally accord to the norms of our Constitution." Id. at 1221. Thus public
officials should understand that they are duty-bound by the norms, even though no court
will hold them to that duty. For a "second pass" at the topic of underenforced norms, see
Sager, supra note 173, at 419-35.
William Forbath's call for recognition of a constitutional right to decent work seems to
fit this model. See Forbath, Free Labor, supra note 67; Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 67.
The constitutional duty in question would fall on the President and Congress to validate
the promise of equal citizenship by assuring citizens the wherewithal to participate effec-
tively in the national community.
179 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era 56
NOTRE DAME LAw. 183, 208-11 (1980) (criticizing the "all deliberate speed" formula for
failing "both the test of principle and the test of expediency").
180 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
181 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (holding that
"principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are
necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by 'appropriate
legislation'"). This power is one of the main illustrations of Lawrence Sager's thesis. See
Sager, supra note 178. The breadth of the "remedial" legislative power recognized in the
Rome decision would seem to obviate the need for Congress to tap into the full potentiali-
ties in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See Sager, supra note 178, at 1228-42.
182 The Commerce Clause is ample authorization for such an exercise of congressional
power, even after United States v. L6pez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Jones Act for exceeding Commerce Clause authority).
183 As the next Part suggests, state governments can make their own contributions to
relieving the harms of underemployment. Here, however, I focus on Congress.
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the high seas to issue the Atlantic Charter, setting out common aspira-
tions of the American and British people. 84 The Charter included
the "Four Freedoms" that Roosevelt had recently articulated,8 5 identi-
fying the "freedom from want" as an essential of the democratic faith.
The Charter was not enforceable as law, but its rhetoric of rights is a
solid political precedent for the freedom to work.
The political value in applying such a rhetoric of rights to the
right to decent work is plain enough: "People mobilize around lights,
not human capital policy.'u 6 But it is also true that people-at least
American people, in our time-expect judges to enforce the rights
they declare. Constitutional rights talk from the courts, when it is not
backed up by judicial enforcement, may be seen as all talk and no
rights. The moral philosopher Judith Shklar said that the right to
work should be respected as "a presumption guiding our policies,"
enjoying "the primacy that a right may claim in any conflict of polit-
ical priorities."'8 7
V
INTERDEPENDENCE: LAW AND THE EXPANSION OF THE SOCIAL
MEANINGS OF WORK
The political morality of a right to work can be translated into
citizens' lives only if government officials and private employers con-
front an issue that has previously seemed too difficult and too painful
to contemplate seriously: the fair distribution of work. In this final
discussion I do not offer proposals of my own to respond to the crisis
of work. Rather, I take up various proposals made by others and ex-
amine them in the light of the social meanings of work, particularly as
those meanings are affected by the constitutional values of liberty,
equality, and national union.
In any initiative to head off a crisis of work, government is likely
to make some distinctive contributions. Still, given that the liberty-
oriented meanings of work closely link self-realization with individual
achievement, I assume that any governmental responses would be
made within the broad outlines of a system in which economic deci-
sions are generally left to market solutions. There is no contradiction
here. Our free market system already includes public interventions in
the employment market, from wage-and-hour laws and antidiscrimina-
184 See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 176 (5th ed. 1993).
185 He did so in a January 1941 address to Congress urging ratification of the Lend-
Lease Agreement that lent naval vessels to the United Kingdom in exchange for access by
the U.S. Navy to certain bases in the Caribbean. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 706 (2d
ed. 1956).
186 Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 67, at 1805.
187 SHELAR, supra note 48, at 99.
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tion laws to the Federal Reserve's adjustment of interest rates to keep
unemployment at a level that will avoid inflationary pressures. 88 It is
consistent with this system, in principle and in practice, for govern-
ment to seek to broaden the base of citizenship by broadening the
base of work.
When I speak of government, I refer both to the United States
and to the states. A single program might involve both levels of gov-
ernment. For example, Congress might condition block grants to the
states on the adoption of state or local plans to attack underemploy-
ment or to relieve underemployment's most serious harms. Such a
program could combine the national government's superior funding
capacity with the benefits of local experimentation.
Recent proposals for legislation responding to the crisis of work
have been notable for their wide variety. Government might seek to
shorten the work week by direct regulation, as Senator Hugo Black
proposed in the 1930s,18 9 but most recent suggestions for legislation
have emphasized incentives that are less coercive. Government might
offer tax subsidies to private employers who adopt work-sharing poli-
cies that pay a living wage even for reduced hours and make health
and pension benefits available to all their workers. Government
might achieve similar results by serving as an employer of last re-
sort, 90 but in my view, other ways of broadening the base of citizen-
ship generally would be preferable. For example, health and pension
benefits, so vital to family security but now inaccessible to the large
number of citizens who are underemployed, might be altogether split
off from employment, with government either subsidizing the benefits
or providing them directly.'91 Government might subsidize day care
for young children, perhaps administered by public and private
school systems.
188 On the latter policy, see supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
189 See RIFIN, supra note 29, at 28. For Rifkin's own elaboration of a similar project,
see id. at 221-35.
190 See, e.g., PHILIP HARVEy, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POL-
ICY AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE UNITED STATES 11-20 passim (1989); Williams & Sander,
supra note 120, at 2047-52. Public funds in the United States have always been used to
create jobs, not just in the New Deal era but in depressed cities of the Northeast in the
1850s, and in a continuous stream of party patronage dispensed at levels high and low.
The idea of spending public money to create jobs has been continuously supported in
surveys of American attitudes in this century. On the spending programs and the surveys,
see Theda Skocpol, Brother, Can You Spare ajob? Work and Welfare in the United States, in THE
NATURE OF WoRK, supra note 32, at 192, 198-201. The practice continues today, in govern-
ment spending on agriculture, on highways, on the space program, and on defense. Let us
not forget how Senator Henry "Scoop"Jackson of Washington earned the titie, "the Sena-
tor from Boeing." See Peter Schrag, Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of
Deliberative Democracy, THE NATION, OcL 19, 1992, at 445.
191 The latter suggestion, heard but ignored during the debate over health care re-
form in 1993, has been renewed. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION:
THE NEv NATIONALiSM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 319 (1995).
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Any of these alternative proposals-subsidy, government provi-
sion, or government employment-would carry significant costs, and
the political obstacles here are huge. Congressional Democrats may
attribute their 1994 rout to the failure of the Administration's propo-
sal for health care reform. One explanation for that fiasco is that the
proposed system was an overcomplicated administrative nightmare. 19
2
But another explanation seems at least as valid: Middle class Ameri-
cans remembered, with some prompting from the insurance compa-
nies, that, however much they believed in good health care for the
poor, they did not want to pay for it.19 The voting public is largely
middle class, the very people who would carry the greatest part of the
burden of any of the employment programs I have mentioned. 94 A
work-sharing policy that costs money can be sold to voters only if they
understand how important work is to individual and group status.
But, as we saw when we looked at work in America from an equality-
oriented perspective, this voter support is no sure thing.195 It is en-
tirely possible that middle class voters, when they focus on the sym-
bolic values of work, will be reluctant to share those symbols of
inclusion with people who are poor, or dark-skinned, or both. As any
parent will attest, it is not easy to teach people to accommodate grasp-
ing and sharing.
Assume, for the moment, that this formidable political hurdle
can be surmounted. The question remains: Can legislation help us to
expand the social meanings of work to reflect not only the values of
liberty but also the values of equality and union-to reflect not only
our pursuit of independence but also our interdependence? My an-
swer is a qualified Yes. To the extent that the law's inducement suc-
ceeds in promoting work-sharing, it can also help to redefine the
meanings of industry and dependability. Similarly, law can help to
192 For one refutation of this position, see John B. Judis, Abandoned Surgery: Business
and the Failure of Health Care Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1995, at 65-66 (blaming the loss
of support from prominent business groups as the cause of the demise of the Health Care
Reform proposal).
193 See, e.g.,James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medioal Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1459, 1500 (1994)
(discussing the prospect of lower quality services for the 85% of the population currently
insured and the spreading of health care dollars over more beneficiaries as a "hidden in-
kind transfer program").
194 Even a steeply graded income tax at the very highest levels never seems to produce
significant revenue-although many Americans might think that an after-tax income of
haIfa million dollars a year would be plenty to live on, even for a movie star or a basketball
player. Perhaps the largest American companies could survive in the competition of the
new world order even if they were not allowed full tax deductions for paying their chief
executive officers at the 1995 rate of 185 times the average pay of their employees. See
Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, CEOs Win, Workers Lose: How Wall Street Rewards Job
Destroers, 1996 INsT. FOR POL'Y STun. THIRD ANN. ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1.
The corresponding ratios in Japan, France, and Germany are 25, 30, and 35. See id.
195 See supra Part II.
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attach the standard meanings of compensable labor to work activities
that, traditionally, have not been so labeled. In doing so, law can also
help to deepen our understanding of earnings and of independence
itself. One who is hostile to these redefinitions may call them lawyers'
rationalizations; one who is more receptive may see them as the shap-
ing of traditional legal forms to fit the actualities of people's lives.
One proposal is that government should find ways to compensate
work that has not traditionally been seen as paid employment. Exam-
ples might include the maintenance of a family home (including
one's own home or that of a relative), care of children (including
one's own children as well as other children), or some forms of com-
munity service now typically performed by volunteers, such as working
with a neighborhood food bank, serving a local youth group, or read-
ing to persons who are blind.196 I am not referring here to "make-
work"jobs, but to work, previously unrecognized as such because it has
not been validated by a wage.
The very mention of "make-work" jobs should be a warning sig-
nal, cautioning that a scheme in which government is the employer is
truly a last resort. A wage serves best to validate work and the worker
when the employment represents an employer's choice. To preserve
the liberty-oriented values of work as validation, any government con-
tribution to the wage ideally should leave an employer free to choose
among applicants for the job. This stricture has obvious application
to the community-service alternatives I have mentioned, but it applies
equally well to any strategy that employs government subsidies to pri-
vate employers.
In conversation, my colleague Richard Sander has suggested to
me a more generalized job-promoting scheme that easily meets this
standard of market validation for work. Congress might authorize a
wage subsidy for all private employers in a given region, perhaps in
the form of a credit against payroll taxes. The amount of the subsidy
could be calibrated to rise and fall with changes in unemployment in
the region and phased out when the regional labor market became
tight enough to generate wage inflation.197 This kind of subsidy
would leave the selection of workers entirely to the employer, with
resulting gains not only in efficiency but in workers' sense that they
are contributing members of society.
196 Jeremy Rifkin argues for this approach as a way to add vitality to the "third sector,"
the independent or volunteer sector that lies between government and the private market.
See RiFriN, supra note 29, at 239-74.
197 The announcement of a five percent national rate of unemployment may conceal
regional differences that are substantial. A sliding-scale regional wage subsidy would have
one advantage over the interest-rate adjustments now administered by the Federal Reserve:
it would not regulate the entire national economy as a lump, but would be more finely
attuned to local needs for stimulus and restraint of growth.
[Vol. 82:523
CRISIS OF WORK
Any system to compensate work that has been traditionally un-
compensated would require some imputation of value to activities for
which there is no standard market price. Consider again the people
who service California's freeway rest-area parks. What is the proper
valuation for their work? There is, let us assume, no established mar-
ket for the labor of people with mental impairments. Should these
workers' services be valued at the cost of hiring a commercial clean-
ing/gardening service? It is not impossible to fix some imputed mar-
ket value, but the market doesn't impute; it buys and sells. Imputing
here is an evaluative exercise that assumes a conclusion. What I value
most in the state's employment of these people is not that the parks
are clean and pleasant, but that the workers are afforded the dignity
of work. This is not a market calculation; rather, it is an evaluation
that gives weight to the inclusion of a group of Californians in our
community.
Pursuing the same theme, consider a legal principle familiar to
any adult Californian: the ownership of community property. (This is
not a play on words; the subject is linked to the people who clean the
parks by more than the word "community.") Although one spouse's
employment income may be considerably greater than the other's,
California law treats each spouse as the owner of half of the total earn-
ings of husband and wife-or, to use language familiar to California
lawyers, half the earnings of the marital community. 198 It used to be
true, in community property states, that the husband managed the
community's property, but now that right of control is divided evenly,
and the United States Constitution stands in the way of any legislative
effort to revive the husband-management system.' 99
Suppose a male entertainer lives in California with his wife, and
that he has a huge income as a performer. His wife produces no in-
come from her own labor, but she shares equally in the community's
earnings and in any property bought with those earnings. In what
sense does her ownership represent the application of free-market
principles? Do we think about this question in the vocabulary of im-
puted earnings, estimating the value of the wife's services in the
home, or estimating the earnings her own labor would bring on the
market if she were employed for pay? 200 Lawyers, of course, are ex-
perts at what economists call imputing. Economists impute; lawyers
deem. In California, I am glad to report, the courts would not waste
their time on evaluating this wife's contribution. She is entitled to a
198 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994).
199 See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-61 (1981).
200 On the valuation of home work, see Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework 84 GEO.
LJ. 1571, 1620-27 (1996). My hypothetical wife-of-megabucks-entertainer hires someone
to do the housework, but most wives, even working wives, do not.
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one-half share because the marriage is deemed to be a community.
And that is that.
The idea that the work of an individual can, in some legal sense,
belong to a community is not a modem invention. In early modern
England and during the colonial era in America, the work of many a
worker was treated by statute or village bylaw as a common resource of
the village or town.2 01 "[O]ne who was a member of the community
owed his or her labor to other community members first and was not
free to depart from the town unless that labor was not needed."
202
Today, of course, it is often the employer who decides that it would be
profitable to leave town. In fact, this sort of market-driven decision is
one marginal contributor to the crisis of work.203 In the perspective
of community responsibility, it is possible to see an analogy to the old
English restrictions on laborers in modem laws and litigation aimed at
protecting communities against some of the devastating harms caused
by factory closures.20 4 Joseph Singer has argued persuasively for a re-
vised legal evaluation of the plant owner's interests, recognizing the
community's role in establishing and maintaining the property rela-
tion.20 5 No one should expect an early revision of the law of property
to reflect the reciprocity of legal duty that Singer envisions. But the
absence of a legal obligation does not release the owner from a moral
201 See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELA-
TION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 60-66 (1991). Assuming
that such a law could be enacted today, it would be unconstitutional as involuntary servi-
tude, or a denial of the right to travel, or perhaps even as a denial of liberty without (sub-
stantive) due process.
202 Id. at 61.
203 See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC IN-
DUSTRY (1982) (discussing the extent and consequences of deindustrialization in America).
204 Some state laws have required companies that close plants to continue health care
plans for laid-off workers for a short time or to offer limited severance pay. See BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, PLANT CLOSINGS: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE 85-41 (1988) (summariz-
ing the state laws). On the other hand, litigation to keep the companies from closing the
plants has been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States
Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying several theories plaintiffs used in seek-
ing to keep two large steel mills open); Amalgamated Local 813, Allied Indus. Workers v.
Diebold, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (refusing to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion that would enjoin the defendant corporation from implementing procedures to close
one plant and consolidate its production in another plant).
205 SeeJoseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 pas-
sim (1988). See also Staughton Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right to Industrial
Property in Youngstown and Pittsburgh, 1977-1987, 74J. AM. HIST. 926 passim (1987) (discuss-
ing local communities' use of eminent domain to retain industrial enterprises); Staughton
Lynd, Towards a Notfor-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of
Industrial Property, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 13, 24-32 (1987) (discussing the idea of emi-
nent domain as a reflection of "the notion that the community has some kind of right in
the industrial property within its borders").
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obligation to others in the community who have nourished the plant
for a generation or more.
The owner's moral obligation can be expressed as a claim
founded on the interdependence of members of a community. Extra-
polating from this claim in the perspectives of liberty, equality, and
union, it is reasonable to say that the freedoms of work and earning
carry with them at least a moral responsibility to the community that
fosters and respects those freedoms. This obligation is not lessened by
describing earnings, and the fruits of earnings, as property. Property
is delegated sovereignty, and it carries at least some of the sovereign's
moral responsibility for fair governance.20 6
A closer historical analogy to community property was the claim,
in the early days of the American women's movement, that a wife
should have a property right in her own household labor and thus
should be entitled to joint rights in marital property-even in a com-
mon law state, by legislation, if not by judicial interpretation. The
claim, which never found a receptive legislature, was a radical chal-
lenge to the legal doctrine that gave a husband a right to his wife's
marital services. A few years ago, Reva Siegel analyzed the joint prop-
erty claim in its historical context and as a contribution to feminist
legal theory. Her analysis illuminates not only its immediate subject,
but also larger questions about the relation of law-in particular, law's
concerns about liberty, equality, and union-to the social meanings of
work.207 If we pay close attention to this claim made by women a cen-
tury and a half ago, we can learn about the potential uses of law in
defining work and earnings, two crucial features of any serious legisla-
tive response to the impending crisis of work.
The joint property claim was not so much an individualist or lib-
ertarian claim as an appeal to the idea of equality of status within the
marital union; women's work at home was said to be embedded in the
family's property.2 08 In the years just before the Civil War, the idea
that work in the home deserved a legal status as work was by no means
obvious to American men-and all the judges at that time were
men.20 9 Today, housework at home is understood to be work, but in
no sense is it the equivalent of paid work. The lack of pay makes
206 See Morris R. Cohen, Propeny and Sovereignty, 13 CoRi, LL L.Q. 8 (1927). For a mod-
em exposition, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrruTION (1993).
207 See Siegel, supra note 70, passim.
208 See id. at 1078.
209 From approximately 1860 on, even the statutes that purported to allow wives to
keep their earnings tended to be interpreted by (male) judges to extend only to work
outside the home (excluding, for example, clothes washing or taking in boarders). Even
as to outside work, judges often gave husbands control over earnings intended to be used
for maintaining the household. See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. LJ. 2127, 2154-57 (1994).
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home work ineligible for credit as employment under the Social Se-
curity system. However, when women work for pay, even doing house-
work in other people's homes, the work not only qualifies as Social
Security employment but also enhances the social meanings attached
to the work.210 When married women work for pay outside the home,
for example, they gain in power-both liberty and equal status-
within the household.21' In these contexts, the critical ingredient is
pay, not work. In a time when it often takes two cash incomes to
maintain a family's middle class status, these differential views of paid
and unpaid housework presumably are being reinforced.
Now, let us think about paying people to care for their own pre-
school children (or, perhaps, for elderly relatives or persons with disa-
bilities).212 It is hard to imagine any work more important to
America's future or more demanding of sensitive, creative effort, than
the care of very young children. No European would give a second
thought to the fairness of a child-care allowance.213 Here in America,
of course, we do value child care, elder care, and care for persons with
disabilities; we even pay for it 2 1 4 As in the case of other work in the
home, the irony is that huge amounts are being paid for the child care
that allows single parents-or, where the parents live together, both
parents-to work outside the home. Again, it is the pay, not the work,
that counts.
Imagine a group of three single mothers who are unrelated.
Some days, Helen cares for Mary's children for pay; other days, Mary
cares for Alice's children for pay; and still other days, Alice cares for
Helen's children for pay. All three of these women's work for pay will
count as work.215 While each is taking care of her own child, however,
that care does not count as work. It does not even qualify as Social
210 This view was propagated by feminists who put aside the joint property proposals in
favor of opening careers for women outside the home and insisting on equal pay for equal
work. See Siegel, supra note 70, at 1191-98.
211 See Ruth Laub Coser, Power Lost and Status Gained: A Step in the Direction of Sex Equal-
ity, in THE NATURE OF WORK, supra note 32, at 71. The gains and losses identified in
Coser's title are the husband's.
212 The public school system becomes a surrogate parent once a child is five years old.
213 For a survey of European family allowances, subsidy or direct provision of child
care, parental leave allowances, and the like, see Handler, supra note 24, at app. B. On
child benefits, child care, and the relation of these allowances to the labor supply (particu-
larly women) in five countries, see generally WELFARE AND WORK INCNT-VES: A NORTH
EUROPEAN PERSPECTE (A.B. Atkinson & Gunnar Viby Mogensen eds., 1993).
214 On the costs of child care, see GoltaiLy, supra note 14, at 24-25, 69. In 1990, mean
spending on child care for families with annual incomes of $15,000 or less ran to 23% of
family income. See id. at 25 tbls.24.
215 If the arrangement is seen as a sham-for example, to inflate earnings for purposes
of getting higher allowances under the Earned Income Tax Credit-then for those pur-
poses, the child care would not count as work.
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Security employment.2 16 In fact, if the mothers are receiving welfare
benefits, some Members of Congress will call them welfare depen-
dents when they stay home to care for their children.217 The contrast
between these two pictures is not merely silly; the pictures depict an
inequality that, in the aggregate, is a massive social wrong. Today,
however, politics is moving to deny welfare assistance to the mother
who is performing the vital work of child care, without making any
serious effort to provide a job outside the home at a wage that will
support her family-and calling this noisome package "welfare
reform."218
Here we have yet another example of the influence of the
worker's group identity-that is, the status of the group-on the value
assigned to work. We have seen how the abstraction "welfare" carries
racially charged meanings emphasizing laziness and dependency,
relics of a past era's rationalizations for slavery.219 Our national expe-
rience with group status inequality offers an important political lesson
for policymakers: Any program to pay parents for the work of caring
for pre-school children should be a universal program, not one tied to
a calculation of need, and thus subject to political manipulation as a
racial issue.220 Whatever problems may inhere in the Social Security
216 Even if home work, including care of one's own children, should not be recognized
as work and given wages, it ought to receive credit as "covered employment" for Social
Security purposes. Nancy Staudt, showing how the tax laws encourage middle class women
to stay home to care for children, has proposed adding home work to the income tax and
Social Security tax base, with a household income tax credit to offset the tax for lowest-
income home workers. See Staudt, supra note 200, at 1620-31. Alternatively, Congress
might authorize Social Security employment credit for home work without taxing it.
217 There is a double bind here. When these mothers do go out to work, they may face
social disapproval for neglecting their children-but that is another story. SeeJoEL F. HAN-
DLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 22-26 (1991).
"Staying home" is a misleading description of women who receive welfare payments.
Because welfare payments usually are insufficient to support a family, most recipients do
have marginal work and, in addition, perform a great deal of unpaid work to make ends
meet. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
218 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (to be codified in various volumes of U.S.C.). See generally
HANDLER, supra note 95 (discussing welfare reform proposals).
219 On "welfare" as a code word for black people, see Robin Toner, New Politics of
Welfare Focuses on Its Flaws, N.Y. TImES, July 5, 1992, at Al (quoting Marian Wright
Edelman). On classical racial stereotypes, see Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
Rxv. 1331, 1373 (1988).
220 Bayard Rustin organized the March on Washington in 1963. No doubt he had in
mind the dangers to black Americans of a heightened sense of racial competition in the
field of work when he remarked, around that time, "We cannot have fair employment until
we have full employment." See Forbath, supra note 108.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
retirement system, one never hears a retiree called a "Social Security
dependent."
221
When the retirement benefits of Social Security were established,
a major purpose of the law was egalitarian: to take older workers out
of the work force so that the available jobs would be shared with
younger workers.222 Ironically, one factor contributing to today's
shortage of decent jobs is itself the result of an egalitarian develop-
ment: the entry of large numbers of married women into the labor
market.223 A few decades ago, most married women stayed home to
do the work of home maintenance and child care. They were com-
pensated for this work only in theory and indirectly, through a "family
wage" paid to their husbands and controlled by their husbands.
These women were explicitly called "dependents," even though their
work was essential to their husbands' capacity to work and earn. The
nineteenth century claim that a married woman should have joint
rights to marital property was founded on just this moral base. It was
the man who was "dependent" on his wife, said the women who articu-
lated this claim,224 and they were correct. Today's proposals to
broaden the definition of work to include home-based work, includ-
ing child care, recognize that a great many people who work for pay
outside the home have the liberty to do so only because someone else
is working inside; they are dependent for their capacity to work on
those home services.
If government were to find ways to assure a wage for home work
and the care of pre-school children, many men and women would still
prefer work outside the home-for all the positive liberty-oriented so-
cial meanings attached to work in that public world. But some wo-
men, and some men, would prefer work in the home, even at a
221 See Theda Skocpol, Sustainable Social Policy: Fighting Poverty without Poverty Programs,
Am. PROSPECt, Summer 1990, at 58, 66-67. A fuller version appears in THE URBAN UNDER-
cLAss 113 (ChristopherJencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
Race was, however, very much in the minds of the legislators who enacted the Social
Security Act in 1935. To garner Southern support for the bill, the congressional leadership
excluded from coverage both farm and domestic workers-occupations with high propor-
tions of poor black citizens. See MCELVAINE, supra note 155, at 257. Dorothy Roberts justifi-
ably argues that universal programs of social support are no substitute for a political
movement to effect more sweeping changes that will make good on the promise to black
Americans of equal citizenship. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black
Citizenship, 105 YALE LJ. 1563 (1996) (book review). In my view, these two strategies do
not pose an either/or choice. The more ambitious movement is still searching for leader-
ship; in the meantime, universal programs have a potential here and now to better the
conditions of life among the black working poor.
222 SeeJAMES T. PATrERSON, AMEmRCA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-1980, at 74
(1981).
223 From 1940 to 1980, white women's participation in the labor market rose from
25.6% to 49.4%. The corresponding increase for black women was from 39.4% to 53.3%.
See WILSON, supra note 123, at 76.
224 See Siegel, supra note 70, at 1101-02.
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reduction in pay, if their families had enough to live on. A recurrent
theme in the literature of work, more often sounded by women than
by men, is that, in many a family, both partners are working outside
the home only because it takes two incomes to maintain the family's
middle class status.225 If there are a significant number of such peo-
ple-and the literature suggests that there are, especially among mar-
fled women who work outside the home but still carry the lion's share
of housework226-then the offer of pay for the work of home and
child care would remove some people from the market for labor
outside the home. To put the analogy to the Social Security retire-
ment system into a caricature, one might foresee an improvement in
poor people's access to decent jobs if fewer middle class Americans
were competing for thosejobs. If a substantial number of men should
take advantage of a home-wage program, so much the better for both
the symbolism and the substance of sex equality. If the tax system
were reformed to minimize its strong bias against second earners-
most commonly wives who work outside the home-and if employ-
ment discrimination law were interpreted to "end the economic
marginalization of caregivers,"227 then married couples might be en-
couraged to opt for more even divisions of work both within and
outside the family unit.
228
Just to state these various possible responses to the shortage of
full-time work is to recognize that every alternative involves a trade-off.
What should replace the old "family wage" system in a time when part-
time work is common? Should employment policy center on individ-
ual workers or on families? Should middle class Americans be en-
couraged to give up home work for jobs outside the home, even
though they may displace other candidates from among the working
poor? Should health care and pension benefits be decoupled from
employment, even though one result may be to diminish the sense
that those benefits, as indicia of social citizenship, are "earned" and
225 See, e.g., B-r= FIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE ch. 8 (1981).
226 See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFr: WOREING PAR-
ENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREAD-
WINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING POWER (1995). As these and many other studies of the
two-earner family make clear, the "revolution" has not relieved women who go out to work
from the main responsibility for house work and child care. For a powerful summary of
the recent evidence, with thorough coverage of the relevant sources, see Staudt, supra note
200, at 1579-85.
227 Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Woi* and Family Entitlements Around Family Values, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 753, 756 (1996). Williams is referring to the structuring of paid
work around an "ideal worker who takes no time off for child-bearing, has no daytime
child rearing responsibilities, and is available 'full-time' and for overtime at short notice."
Id. at 753. In our society this ideal worker, of course, is modeled on a behavioral norm that
describes most men and most unmarried women who do not have children.




therefore deserved? In answering questions such as these, the makers
of policy, both public and private, confront challenge aplenty. The
one unacceptable alternative, however, is the current policy of drift
toward deeper and deeper social division.
As we seek to respond to the impending crisis of work, one re-
warding by-product may be that Americans will come to see our inter-
dependence more clearly by seeing it in the world of work. Judith
Shklar called "earning" an essential of full citizenship, and contrasted
the independence that accompanies earning with the dependence of
welfare beneficiaries who are "treated with that mixture of parental-
ism and contempt that has always been reserved for the dependent
classes." 229 In common speech, though, earning has at least two
meanings. Usually we think of "earning" as being paid for work; this is
the meaning Shklar had in mind. But we can also say of someone, as
the nineteenth century joint property advocates said of a wife, that she
is "earning her keep,"230 and when we say this, we are implying that
she should not be treated as a dependent. Interdependence, too, is a
negation of dependence.23
1
It remains true, nonetheless, that a price in money is our society's
most visible sign of value, and that our most important token of earn-
ing one's keep is a money wage. Law has expressive power and educa-
tive power. Not the least important function of a law that assured
wages for home and child care-not a handout, but earnings paid to
those who earn their keep in this way-would be its reminder that the
work of home and child care; like the work of school teachers, is valu-
able to us all.
Even if I have overstated the case that the shortage of decent
work threatens the American constitutional order, a poverty rate of
fourteen percent-twenty percent among our children 232-is a dis-
graceful inequality in a nation so blessed with abundance as the
United States in our time. The persistence of poverty for so many
Americans shows how artificial it is to publish an official unemploy-
ment rate around five or six percent. Calling such a rate "natural"
compounds the disgrace by evading responsibility for a condition that
government deliberately maintains. I concede that concerns about in-
flation may require an interest-rate policy that will produce some level
229 SHKiAR, supra note 48, at 96-98.
230 Siegel, supra note 70, at 1112.
231 See MARTHA MINoW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAw 267-311 (1990) (family relations); Singer, supra note 205, at 652-99 (em-
ployment relations).
232 See supra note 25.
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of unemployment.23 3 I concede, too, that such a policy will, to some
degree, undermine any proposal-either the ones we have considered
or others yet to come-for government to assure paid work for all who
want it. But, for the unemployed, the stakes are economic survival. If
the crucial regulating body declares that we are near "full employ-
ment" (meaning the "natural" level of unemployment), what are peo-
ple to do when they are thrown off welfare and told to "Get ajob"?
If the United States continues its policy of maintaining a perma-
nent pool of unemployed and underemployed citizens, Congress, the
President and the state legislatures have the corresponding duty-the
moral duty and the political duty-to assure those citizens who are
involuntarily unemployed or underemployed that their families will
be secure. More specifically, government has the duty to assure that
every family has enough resources to live on and has good medical
care and decent retirement benefits. Even if no crisis of work were
impending, our constitutional commitments to liberty, to equality,
and to national union would demand a serious national effort to pro-
mote the fair distribution of work and its associated benefits.
It may be, as one cynical view has it, that the constitutional order
will not be threatened by an economically split society, so long as ra-
cial and ethnic antagonisms can be counted on to divide the down-
and-out from each other. A cynic might also say that if the constitu-
tional order has survived a period in which about one out of six or
seven Americans is living in poverty, then there is no short-term dan-
ger to the majority in letting that proportion rise to one out of four or
five. I am not suggesting that anyone should hope for still higher
levels of misery to insure a political upheaval. What we should be hop-
ing for-and demanding from our elected representatives-is vigor-
ous action to strengthen the material and moral foundations of equal
citizenship. The larger constitutional lesson from the world of work is
that America's historic concerns for liberty and for equality need not
be seen as competing. Both contribute to the interdependence of citi-
zens that is the foundation for the national union. A sharp improve-
ment in access to decent work is needed right now to serve the ends of
justice; ultimately it will be needed to preserve the constitutional or-
der on which all our liberties depend.
233 See supra note 2.
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